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ABSTRACT 
 
John Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry:  An Interpretation of a Classical American 
Approach to Logic.  (May 2006) 
Troy Nicholas Deters, B.A., University of Toledo 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. John J. McDermott 
 
During the 20th century, John Dewey introduced a new idea with respect to the 
nature of logical theory:  He presented a portrait of logic as a theory about how 
organisms interact and maintain an integrated balance between themselves and their 
environment.  He wrote many texts on what he called his theory of inquiry, including 
Essays in Experimental Logic (1916), Studies in Logical Theory (1903), and How We 
Think (1910).  However, the book where he most closely detailed his theory of inquiry is 
in his Logic:  The Theory of Inquiry (1938).  These texts by Dewey have served as the 
source for much recent discussion and commentary in Dewey scholarship.  Most of these 
interpretations on Dewey’s theory of inquiry, I maintain, misunderstand Dewey in some 
fundamental way.  I argue that these commentators have gone wrong in interpreting 
Dewey and his works by failing to understand some aspect of his theory of inquiry.  I 
illustrate the flaws in their interpretations and subsequently integrate the conclusions I 
reach into a single, cohesive perspective on Dewey’s account of inquiry.  The final 
chapter presents a new interpretation of Dewey that emphasizes the role of phenomenal, 
contextual, and social factors in the foundations of his logical works. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY 
AND THE EXPOSITION OF A PURSUIT 
 Even though John Dewey is not primarily remembered for his research in logical 
theory (which he also called his theory of inquiry), his work in this field is still 
significant and relevant enough to concrete practices to be regarded as highly important 
doctrines.  In contrast to most of the formal logic developing during his time-period, 
Dewey’s was developed with the intention of impacting existential affairs.  Dewey’s 
account of logic was his theory about the process of inquiry, where inquiry arises when 
an organism encounters an indeterminate situation.  By examining his concept of inquiry 
alone, one will see the relevance that it has to organisms and how they interact with 
common affairs.  Thus, logic is a theory that formulates the methods by which an 
organism gains and maintains control over their environment, not with the subject-
predicate analysis of linguistic statements.   
 Dewey’s writings on logic are extensive and occur throughout many of his 
books.  In his Studies in Logical Theory (1903), Dewey first develops his account of 
instrumentalism.  Dewey expands on this doctrine in subsequent writings, including in 
his next major publication in the field of logic, Essays in Experimental Logic (1916). 
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Here, Dewey discusses the development of his instrumentalism, his views on thought, 
and his account of propositions and judgments, among other topics.  Following this 
book, Dewey published his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, which he spent over forty 
years developing.  In this book, Dewey details his process of inquiry and how it relates 
to scientific knowledge. 
 Understanding Dewey’s logic is impossible without examining the historical 
context of Dewey’s work.  Most importantly, considering the point that Dewey’s 
research was not similar to Bertrand Russell’s and Gottlob Frege’s is part of the key to 
bringing to light a clear picture of Dewey’s intentions.  In addition, the fact that Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry was strongly influenced by Charles S. Peirce’s discussion of inquiry 
will place Dewey’s account within the context of the work taking place in American 
philosophy during Dewey’s own time-period.  Instead of discussing how Dewey’s logic 
differs from traditional formal logic or how it relates to accounts developing during his 
own time-period, I will discuss something different.  Rather, I will examine various 
commentators’ interpretations of Dewey, including those developed by Bertrand Russell, 
Tom Burke, and Douglas Browning.   
 During Dewey’s time-period, the movement of modern day formal logic was 
becoming a powerful presence.  One of the founders of this movement was Frege.  
Following Frege, Russell made large contributions as well.  Dewey, then, was 
introducing his logical theory, one which grew in opposition to Aristotelian logic, during 
a time in which Aristotelian logic was influencing modern logic.  The acceptance of 
Dewey’s writings, then, did not come with a generous welcome by formal logicians, 
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including Russell.  Instead, Dewey’s work underwent significant controversy from 
Russell’s standpoint. 
 This controversy emerged through correspondence between Russell and Dewey 
through articles and book chapters.  Russell initiated the debate with his publication 
“Dewey’s New Logic.”1  Dewey responded to this publication in an essay entitled 
“Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder.”2  From this point, the exchanges 
between the two continued to ensue for several years.   
 In his book Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell, Tom Burke examines 
Dewey’s logical theory from the standpoint of the debate that took place between Dewey 
and Russell.  Burke’s intention in this book is not to assist Russell in furthering 
criticisms against Dewey.  Rather, it is to clarify Dewey’s writings and clear it of some 
of the confusions and misinterpretations brought forth against it by Russell.   
 Even though Burke has provided a strong defense of Dewey’s theory of inquiry 
against Russell’s criticisms, there is one aspect of his book that is in need of 
reconsideration.  Burke’s emphasis on the role of evolution in Dewey is a bit overstated 
and neglects to take into account other important factors of inquiry for Dewey, including 
the role of the postulate of immediate empiricism in Dewey’s philosophy and the social 
foundations of inquiry.  Without considering these factors, an accurate interpretation of 
Dewey’s logical writings cannot be provided. 
 Douglas Browning is another author who has contributed substantially to our 
understanding of Dewey’s theory of inquiry.  In 1997, Browning delivered a 
                                                          
1  Bertrand Russell, “Dewey’s New Logic,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, vol. 1, The Library of 
Living Philosophers, ed., Paul Arthur Schlipp  (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1939), 149. 
2  Tom Burke, Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 8. 
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presentation entitled “Some Remarks on Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic” for the American 
Philosophical Association.  In this paper, Browning provides an assessment and review 
of Burke’s book.  While Browning notes that Burke has provided a first-rate assessment 
of Dewey’s work and insightfully analyzed the debate that took place between Dewey 
and Russell, Browning does identify a few major misinterpretations Burke commits.  
One of the major aspects of Burke’s book that Browning disagrees with is his discussion 
of situations.   
 In this thesis, I will closely examine this secondary literature.  Even though it is 
all certainly of first-rate quality, I would still, nevertheless, like to discuss the extent to 
which it accurately interprets Dewey’s textual writings.  The two primary secondary 
authors’ interpretations of Dewey I will consider include Russell and Burke, each of 
whom have made substantial contributions to this area of philosophy.  However, their 
readings of Dewey are not without their own errors.  Where Russell and Burke have 
gone wrong in arriving at their delineations of Dewey’s logical writings, I will argue, is 
that they have each failed to correctly interpret various aspects of it.    
 Pursuing this thesis will allow the opportunity to not only arrive at a more in-
depth analysis of Dewey’s logic, but also to diagnose some of the errors brought forth by 
other commentators on this topic.  The significance and relevance of this thesis to 
current debates surrounding Dewey’s theory of inquiry is revealed insofar as it attempts 
to provide a clearer depiction of Dewey’s theory in consideration of recent discussions 
surrounding it, including the work by Russell, Burke, and Browning. 
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 In pursuing this project, I will rely on multiple sources, some primary and some 
secondary.  To begin Chapter II, I will provide a discussion of the different logical 
theories that are relevant to the debate that ensued between Dewey and Russell.  First, I 
will discuss Dewey’s account of propositions and judgments in order to contrast it with 
the versions developed by Frege and Russell.  In order to delineate Dewey’s account, I 
will rely on his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938).  The latter text is where Dewey 
develops in detail his final writings on logic.  I will contrast Dewey’s writings on 
propositions and judgments with those developed by traditional logicians, including 
Frege and Russell.  In order to briefly discuss Frege’s work, I will rely on his articles 
“On Sense and Meaning” and “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.”  My discussion of 
Russell’s account will make use of his Introduction to Mathematical Logic (1919).   
 Secondly, after discussing their accounts of propositions and judgments, I will 
examine in further detail various aspects of Dewey’s logical writings in order to assess 
the accuracy of some of Russell’s criticisms.  In particular, I will examine in further 
detail Dewey’s discussion of propositions.  In order to provide this discussion, I will 
examine the following sources, “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth,” by 
John Dewey; “Some Remarks on Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic,” by Douglas Browning; 
and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, by John Dewey.  After this examination, I will discuss 
some of the criticisms that Russell directed against Dewey’s work.  To accomplish this, I 
will rely on Russell’s book chapter “John Dewey,” his article “Dewey’s New Logic,” 
and his book An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.  Throughout this process, I will rely on 
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Tom Burke’s book Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell for commentary and insight 
on various aspects of Dewey. 
 In Chapter III, I will turn to an examination of Burke’s treatment of the debate 
that took place between Dewey and Russell.  Burke develops this discussion in his book 
Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell.  Thus, in order to present his position on the 
role of evolution in Dewey’s account of situations, I will turn to his writings in Chapter 
II of his book.  While it seems plausible that evolution plays some role in Dewey’s 
thought, in order to be certain about the extent to which the influence is prevalent, I will 
delineate his discussion in his article “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy.”   
 Upon accomplishing this, I will provide an interpretation of Dewey that 
emphasizes the experiential and social aspects of inquiry rather than the reductionistic 
evolutionary account presented by Burke.  Burke misinterprets Dewey insofar as he 
places too much emphasis on the role of physical language.  My interpretation will rely 
on Dewey’s “Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” and Chapter III, “The Existential 
Matrix of Inquiry: Cultural,” of his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. 
 Following this, in Chapter IV I will articulate Douglas Browning’s 
reconsideration of Burke’s account of situations.  Browning criticizes Burke’s account of 
situations on the grounds that Burke misinterprets Dewey’s discussion.  Burke conceives 
of Dewey’s notion of a situation to consist of indeterminateness, confusion, doubt, and 
uncertainty.  In short, there is a total breakdown of the functioning of the organism in 
relation to its environment.  Browning presents a different understanding of Dewey’s 
notion of a situation based upon Dewey’s discussion as it occurs in his Logic.  Here, 
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Dewey seems to attribute to indeterminate situations the traits that Burke attributes to 
Dewey’s presentation of situations.  Thus, Burke seems to confuse Dewey’s account of 
situations with his view of indeterminate situations.   
 Browning presents situations as the qualitative traits of experiences that cannot 
be captured by any conceptual or cognitive scheme.  In this chapter, I will begin by 
discussing Browning’s presentation “Some Remarks on Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic.”  
In doing this, I will also examine various excerpts from Burke’s book Dewey’s New 
Logic to consider them in light of Browning’s discussions.  In addition, I will also 
explore a response that Dewey delivers to Russell’s criticisms against him.  Some of 
Dewey’s responses to the criticisms brought forth by Russell occur in his “Experience, 
Knowledge, and Value.” 
 Even though exploring all of these authors’ interpretations in greater detail will 
not exhaust all of the recent scholarship into Dewey’s logical writings, it will, 
nevertheless, present new perspectives on the topics I will consider.  Research into this 
area has undergone substantial contributions from numerous authors in the past century 
by authors such as Tom Burke, Douglas Browning, Larry Hickman, Ralph W. Sleeper, 
and H. S. Thayer.  All of these authors have provided insightful and creative 
interpretations of Dewey and his philosophy.  Hopefully, in discussing their research in 
this thesis, I will illustrate the insightfulness and creativity of their work.  Finally, just as 
the aforementioned authors have made contributions to Dewey and his philosophical 
writings, I hope to do the same by considering their work and presenting my own 
interpretations on the debates that have ensued since Dewey’s first publication on logic.
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CHAPTER II 
DEWEY ON PROPOSITIONS: THE CRITIQUE OF RUSSELL AND BURKE 
 John Dewey’s logical theory is unique in many respects, which is illustrated most 
clearly in its divergence from the traditional Frege-Russell development of logic.  
Dewey’s account is much more broad and encompassing than the theories developed by 
his predecessors and contemporaries, including Frege and Russell.  The role that logical 
notions play in Russell’s, Frege’s, and Dewey’s theories, such as propositions, truth, 
warranted assertibility, and judgments, serve to differentiate their accounts of logic from 
one another.   
 A serious amount of debate took place between Russell and Dewey about their 
theories.  Throughout much literature on the topic, Russell continued to criticize Dewey 
for his stances, while Dewey defended himself against those allegations.  Russell’s 
primary concern over Dewey’s logical writings was not clearly developed, as he did not 
target a series of criticisms against one single aspect of Dewey’s thought.  Rather, he 
targeted criticisms against many different areas.  However, Dewey’s account of 
propositions and judgments was an area that Russell gave more attention to relative to 
other areas of Dewey’s work that Russell considered.   
 Russell’s mistake in assessing Dewey’s work is that he inserted his own beliefs 
and theories into his reading of Dewey.  Russell believed in the eternal truth or falsity of 
propositions; they have a definite, timeless truth value.1  For Dewey, propositions can 
only be understood in their relation to inquiry, which arises out of an indeterminate 
                                                          
1  See, for example, Russell (1919), p. 155. 
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situation.  Russell criticized Dewey for not upholding the account of propositions that he 
held. 
 In this chapter, I will begin with a discussion of the role that propositions and 
judgments serve in the theories of Dewey, Frege, and Russell.  Doing so will provide for 
a transition into a taxonomy and analysis of Dewey’s different types of propositions.  
After this discussion, I will argue that context plays an important role in Dewey’s 
analysis of propositions and is a feature of his thought that cannot be neglected.  
Following this, I will examine a few criticisms that Burke directs against Russell.  
Afterwards, I will direct a criticism of my own against Russell’s interpretation of 
Dewey’s account of propositions based on conclusions I have drawn throughout the 
essay.   
2.1 Propositions and Judgments: Dewey’s, Frege’s, and Russell’s Stances 
Propositions and judgments play an important role in both Dewey’s and Russell’s logical 
writings.  They have their own separate functions, and are treated differently from the 
perspective of Dewey to Russell, and vice versa.  In this section, I will delineate 
Dewey’s, Frege’s, and Russell’s views on propositions and judgments, and then contrast 
them.    
 For Dewey, propositions and judgments have to be understood in relation to their 
function in inquiry, in terms of their role in bringing forth a warrantably assertible 
judgment.  Dewey discusses propositions and judgments in the following text: 
    Propositions are logically distinct from judgments, and yet are the necessary logical 
instrumentalities for reaching final warranted determination of judgment.  Only by 
means of symbolization (the peculiar differentia of propositions) can direct action be 
deferred until inquiry into conditions and procedures has been instituted.  The overt 
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activity, when it finally occurs, is, accordingly, intelligent instead of blind. 
Propositions as such are, consequently, provisional, intermediate and instrumental.2 
 
This passage reveals a distinction between propositions and judgments.  Both play a 
fundamental role in inquiry.  Propositions serve an instrumental and intermediate role in 
contributing to the establishment of a warrantably assertible judgment.  In addition, 
propositions are carried through by symbols, and, consequently, have no existential 
import.  They are to be understood in the context of bringing forth a warrantably 
assertible judgment.   
 Judgments are what result from the process of inquiry.  Dewey expresses this in 
Chapter VII, “The Construction of Judgment,” of his Logic: “judgment may be identified 
as the settled outcome of inquiry.  It is concerned with the concluding objects that 
emerge from inquiry in their status of being conclusive.”3  Judgments have existential 
import; they are concerned with concrete, everyday affairs.  Their establishment has an 
impact on an indeterminate situation; they transform it into one that is stable and 
characterized by equilibrium.  Dewey discusses the process underlying judgments as 
follows: “Judgment has been analyzed to show that it is a continuous process of 
resolving an indeterminate, unsettled situation into a determinately unified one, through 
operations which transform subject-matter originally given.”4  
 Contrary to Dewey’s views, Frege’s and Russell’s positions on propositions and 
judgments differ in fundamental respects.  The influence of Frege’s work on Russell is 
revealed clearly by examining their texts.  For Frege and Russell, the focus of logic is 
                                                          
2  John Dewey: The Later Work, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 12: 1938, Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 283. 
3  Dewey, Logic, 120. 
4  Dewey, Logic, 283. 
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arriving at truth values.  Determining truth values consists of the analysis of propositions 
to determine their truth or falsity.  To begin, I will provide a discussion of Frege’s 
account of propositions.  Afterwards, I will discuss Russell’s account.   
 In what ensues, I will provide a brief exegetical interpretation of Frege.  
Although this will not provide a comprehensive account of Frege’s philosophy, I trust 
that it will provide a representative account of his position on propositions, judgments, 
and assertions.  I acknowledge that Frege’s philosophy of logic may be a lot broader 
than the perspective I will emphasize, but my goal is to present Frege’s account just to 
show that, from a historical perspective, it influenced Russell’s stance on propositions 
and judgments.   
 The standards set forth by Frege regard propositions as being either true or false.  
There are only two possible truth values, True or False, and therefore no other possible 
truth values, as Frege’s writings indicate: “We are therefore driven into accepting the 
truth-value of a sentence as constituting what it means.  By the truth-value of a sentence 
I understand the circumstances that it is true or false.  There are no other truth-values.”5  
Every proposition has the semantic property of truth or falsity under every context.  
Frege indicates this clearly in the following text: 
Without wishing to give a definition, I call a [proposition] something for which the 
question of truth arises.  So I ascribe what is false to a [proposition] just as much as 
what is true.  So I can say: the [proposition] is the sense of the sentence without 
wishing to say that the sense of every sentence is a [proposition]....  We say a sentence 
expresses a [proposition].... [T]wo things must be distinguished in an indicative 
sentence: the content, which it has in common with the corresponding sentence-
question, and the assertion.  The former is the [proposition], or at least contains the 
                                                          
5  Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Meaning” in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Frege, eds., 
Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1952), 63. 
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[proposition].  So it is possible to express the [proposition] without laying it down as 
true.  Both are so closely joined in an indicative sentence that it is easy to overlook the 
separability.  Consequently we may distinguish: 
 
(1) the apprehension of a [proposition]–thinking; 
(2) the recognition of the truth of a [proposition]–judgment; 
(3) the manifestation of this judgment–assertion.6 
 
A proposition is the content of some sentence.  The proposition itself is not the 
declarative sentence or anything else that is discursively written or uttered.  Rather, it is 
what is conveyed by the sentence.  The actual assertion is not to be confused with the 
proposition.  A judgment, for Frege, is the determination of the semantic content of the 
proposition, that is, whether it is true or false.  Thus, the judgment differs from the 
proposition in so far as the former is the apprehension of what the latter inherently 
contains, namely, a truth value.  The assertion is the declarative sentence that is spoken 
or written.  It is the discursive statement.   
 The first sentence of the previously quoted paragraph illustrates that propositions 
are simply granted that they have a definite truth value.  Propositions, under this account, 
are taken to have an inherent truth value.  However, Frege writes that a proposition is 
either true or false.  Consequently, he is endorsing a particular view of propositions, 
namely, defining them to have a particular truth value.  Thus, someone else, such as 
Dewey, could define a proposition in a different way.  The fact that it is a definition 
could substantiate an argument that propositions do not have an inherent truth value.  
Intertwined within Dewey’s notion of a proposition is a judgment.  A judgment is the 
                                                          
6  Gottlob Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,”  Mind 65 (July 1956): 289-311. 
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recognition of the truth value of a proposition.  Judgments, then, have the notion of truth 
values intricately interwoven within their definition.   
 Now, I will show the influence of Frege on Russell.  Propositions, under 
Russell’s account, have a fixed antecedent logical reality.  Truth values are fixed 
throughout time; there is an “absolute” truth or falsity to propositions.  This is clearly 
stated throughout Russell’s writings.  Consider the following passage by Russell: 
When, in the preceding chapter, we were discussing propositions, we did not attempt 
to give a definition of the word “proposition.”  But although the word cannot be 
formally defined, it is necessary to say something as to its meaning, in order to avoid 
the very common confusion with “propositional functions,” which are to be the topic 
of the present chapter.   
 We mean by a “proposition” primarily a form of words which expresses what is 
either true or false.  I say “primarily,” because I do not wish to exclude other than 
verbal symbols, or even mere thoughts if they have a symbolic character.  But I think 
the word “proposition” should be limited to what may, in some sense, be called 
“symbols,” and further to such symbols as give expression of truth and falsehood.  
Thus “two and two are four” and “two and two are five” will be propositions, and so 
will “Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is not a man.”7 
 
Russell begins this passage by stating that he wants to arrive at a definition of what 
propositions are.  He takes propositions as inherently having some particular truth value.  
Rather than wishing to define propositions as how he understands them, Russell argues 
that propositions have a certain “meaning,” which he identifies with, under his account, 
the truth or falsity of propositions.   
 As the previous discussions indicate, Russell’s analysis of propositions and 
Dewey’s analysis differ.  Whereas Dewey emphasizes warranted assertibility in relation 
to propositions, Russell does not.  Furthermore, while Russell emphasizes his view that 
propositions have semantic properties, Dewey presents an alternative perspective.  While 
                                                          
7  Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1993), 155.   
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Dewey does say that warranted assertibility is the outcome of a successful inquiry, this is 
not intended to portray warranted assertibility as a substitution for truth.  In other words, 
Dewey does not introduce this notion in order to present it in contrast with or as an 
opposition to Russell’s account of propositions.  
 Russell makes the error of assuming that warranted assertibility is intended to be 
Dewey’s substitution for truth, as in this passage by Russell: “Dr. Dewey holds that it 
has ‘warranted assertibility’–which he substitutes for ‘truth’–if it has certain kinds of 
effects.”8  In fact, Dewey does not endorse this view, and Russell seems to overlook this.  
Consider the following passage by Dewey: 
    Mr. Russell refers to my theory as one which “substitutes ‘warranted assertibility’ 
for truth.”  Under certain conditions, I should have no cause to object to this reference.  
But the conditions are absent; and it is possible that this view of “substitution” as 
distinct from and even opposed to definition, plays an important role in generating 
what I take to be misconceptions of my theory in some important specific matters.  
Hence, I begin by saying that my analysis of “warranted assertibility” is offered as a 
definition of the nature of knowledge in the honorific sense according to which only 
true beliefs are knowledge.9 
 
Here, Dewey argues against the view that warranted assertibility can be substituted for 
truth.  In fact, this has become a misconception of his theory.  Warranted assertibility is 
rather how Dewey defines knowledge: only true beliefs, meaning those that are justified 
judgments, are to count as knowledge.  Observing that Dewey’s and Russell’s logics are 
different in fundamental respects, and are not replacements of one another, is the key to 
understanding some of the criticisms that Russell raised against Dewey’s logical theory.
  
                                                          
8  Bertrand Russell, “John Dewey” in A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1945), 826. 
9  John Dewey, “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth,” The Journal of Philosophy 38 (March 
1941): 265. 
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2.2 Dewey’s Taxonomy of Propositions 
The word proposition, for Dewey, has a different meaning than the traditional account.  
Most of the theories preceding Dewey’s are concerned with the formal truth or falsity of 
a given proposition.  Propositions in Dewey’s view are something put forth to be 
considered; they are put forth as means for bringing forth a warrantably assertible 
judgment.  As such, they serve an intermediate role in the process of inquiry.  Dewey 
was concerned with three sorts of attributions of things: qualities, kinds, and modes-of-
being.  These three sorts of attributions can only be understood within some particular 
context, in particular, the inquiry that is taking place.  Propositions and logical forms 
only make sense within the context of some particular subject-matter.  In this section, I 
will discuss Dewey’s views on the nature and function of his different types of 
propositions. 
 Particular propositions are the most basic forms of propositions.  They qualify a 
statement that refers to an individual, this, by attributing a sensory quality to it as a 
predicate.  An example that Dewey gives of this is, “This is sour.”  In this example, a 
sensory quality (sour) is being attributed as a predicate to a particular individual, this.  
By a statement such as, “This is sour,” it formulates two possible scenarios.  First, some 
object that has been tasted has the property of being sour.  Second, if certain 
circumstances take place, it is predicated that it will have the property of sourness.   
 Singular propositions determine something to be of a particular kind.  Consider 
the sentence, “This is sweet.”  There are two possible interpretations of the sentence.  A 
particular proposition would interpret the sentence such that a quality (sweetness) is 
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being attributed to something in particular.  If it is interpreted as a singular proposition, 
then it is classifying it as being in a certain category, namely, of being sweet.  Thus, the 
distinction between a particular proposition and singular is that the former attributes a 
quality (that is, for instance, is sweet, sour, or red) to some individual object, whereas 
the latter classifies it as falling within a category (that is, for instance, the category of 
oranges, buses, or books). 
 Contingent-conditional propositions are hypothetical propositions that refer to 
singulars.  An example that Dewey gives of this is, “If this drought continues the harvest 
will be very poor.”  This conditional statement expresses an existential relationship 
between the antecedent and the consequent.  In other words, the antecedent and 
consequent have real-life meaning.  What makes these types of propositions unique is 
that they contain singular propositions as their antecedent and consequent.10  These 
propositions are always marked by an “If-then” relationship.   
 Contingent-disjunctive propositions exclusively differentiate different kinds.  
Consider, for example, the statement, “Metals are either copper, or tin, or lead...”  These 
propositions exhaust a wide range of possibilities, allowing one to narrow down facts.  
The purpose these conditionals serve is when, for example, someone has what they think 
is metal and is trying to determine whether it in fact is, contingent-disjunctive 
propositions allow the person to test it against the different types of metals that fall 
within the disjunction of subkinds.  
                                                          
10  As I understand this, the singular proposition in the antecedent is ‘drought’, since it is a kind of rainfall, 
that is, a period which has no rainfall.  The singular proposition in the consequent is ‘harvest’ because it is 
a kind of season, one when crops ripen. 
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 Universal propositions involve modes of action.  They formulate constraints 
among the different types of things that belong to kinds of things.  In other words, they 
delineate the characteristics that hold for kinds.  Universal propositions formulate 
constraints that serve to differentiate certain kinds from other kinds.  For example, a 
universal proposition would serve to formulate constraints that would differentiate the 
kind metal from another kind, such as a harvest.  They set characteristics in place that 
define (or limit) a given kind of thing.  Universal propositions differ from singular 
propositions insofar as the latter state that some particular object is a given kind, whereas 
the former state the characteristics that belong to the latter.  They specify characteristics 
independently of any particular situation.  These propositions are presumed to remain 
universal across all situations. 
 Universal disjunctive propositions serve to narrow down a wide range of possible 
alternatives.  The purpose of them is to rule out a wide range of alternatives by 
categorizing things of certain kinds as having disjunctions of subcategories.  The kind of 
agent “souring agent” can be categorized as including “lemons, or tomatoes, or vinegar,” 
its disjunction of subcategories.   
2.3 The Role of the Context and Situation in Dewey’s Logical Theory 
The previous presentation of Dewey’s taxonomy of propositions serves to illustrate the 
importance of the context and situation in Dewey’s work.  All of the propositions 
presented rely upon some particular subject-matter for their existence.  For Dewey, 
propositions arise within some particular subject-matter and play an instrumental role 
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(they are “tools”) for arriving at a warrantably assertible judgment.  Propositions can 
only be understood within their context in inquiry.   
 Some commentators on Dewey have written about this topic, for example, Tom 
Burke in his book Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell.  In addition to his book 
publication, he has published many articles and has delivered many presentations on 
Dewey’s theory of inquiry.  Burke discusses propositions and inquiry in the 
aforementioned book in a way which provides support to my discussion.  Consider what 
Burke writes in Chapter VII, “Propositions and Judgments,” of his Dewey’s New Logic: 
“These three sorts of attribution, not to mention the taxonomy of propositions Dewey 
presents on the basis of this three-way distinction, make sense only in the context of 
their function in inquiry.”11  As Burke writes, the three attributions presented above and 
Dewey’s taxonomy of propositions only make sense within some particular inquiry. 
 Another commentator on Dewey’s theory of inquiry is Douglas Browning of the 
University of Texas, Austin.  He has published articles on and delivered presentations in 
this field.  Douglas Browning has provided a presentation, “Some Remarks on Burke’s 
Dewey’s New Logic,” in which he discusses the role of situations and inquiry in Dewey’s 
account of logic, in addition to assessing Burke’s interpretation of Dewey.  Douglas 
Browning discusses inquiry as follows in the aforementioned presentation: “Here it is 
important to observe that every inquiry, including inquiry into inquiry, is initiated by and 
within a specific problematic situation with a unique and pervasive quality of 
                                                          
11  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 177. 
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indetermination.”12  Browning illustrates by this passage that inquiry occurs only when a 
problematic situation is taking place.  Since propositions take place within the context of 
inquiry, propositions can only be understood within a particular situation.   
 Further support for this claim can be evidenced by an analysis of the above 
propositional types.  All of the propositional types delineated involve at least one of the 
three attributions of things discussed: qualities of things, kinds of things, and modes-of-
being.  Qualities of things involve the particular attributes that belong to something, such 
as a particular color.  Dividing objects into particular categories delineates kinds of 
things.  Thus, the “red-ness” of a specific bicycle is concerned with its quality, being the 
color red.  The categorization of what we call ‘bicycles’ as “bicycles” involves the 
attribution of kinds.  Consequently, it would be odd to try to imagine these two kinds of 
attributions, qualities and kinds, outside of some particular context.  For instance, to 
attempt to imagine something having a quality outside of the context of such things as 
colors, for example, to instantiate them.  The same thing applies to modes-of-being.  
These can only be understood as relations between different kinds of things.  Since they 
involve relations, there must be some context in which they occur in order to be 
captured.  It doesn’t seem plausible to say that relations between things take place when 
they do not occur within any subject-matter (there would be nothing for there to be 
relations between). 
 Having discussed the importance of propositions in relation to the establishment 
of a warrantably assertible judgment, I will now turn to a discussion of the role that 
                                                          
12  Douglas Browning,  “Some Remarks on Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic,” (invited paper), American 
Philosophical Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, April 24, 1997.   
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context plays in relation to judgments.  Considering that the context plays such an 
important role for Dewey’s analysis of propositions, it would only seem to follow that 
context would play an important role for judgments, since propositions play a role in 
arriving at warrantably assertible judgments.  In order to illustrate this, it is important to 
turn to Dewey’s discussion of judgments.   
 Successful inquiries are directed towards establishing a warranted judgment, 
which means that they are aimed at arriving at a stable conclusion.  A judgment for 
Dewey consists of establishing a determinate predicate to a subject.  Thus, if we let ‘s’ 
stand for some subject and ‘p’ for some  predicate, then a sentence ‘s is p’ is said to be 
warrantably utterable.13  The judgment is actually asserted by acting in accordance with 
the predicate p in some particular situation.  Dewey’s stance here is very action-oriented, 
meaning that there is a direct correlation between an inquirer acting in accordance with 
some particular predicate in some situation.  Subjects and predicates cannot be 
understood apart from some particular context that instantiates each of them.  This is an 
attempt on Dewey’s part to provide a naturalistic understanding of logic.  Consider the 
following text by Dewey to illustrate this:   
    In the case of the meaning of words, ... happenings, like sounds, which originally 
were devoid of significance acquire meaning by use, and that this use always involves 
a context.  With children just learning to understand and use speech, the context is 
largely that of objects and acts.  A child associates hat with putting something on the 
head when he is going outdoors; drawer with pulling something out of a table, etc.  
Single words, because of the direct presence of a context of actions performed with 
objects, then have the force that complete sentences have to an older person.  
Gradually other words that originally gained meaning by use in a context of overt 
actions become capable of supplying the context, so that the mind can dispense with 
the context of things and deeds.  Speaking in sentences marks obviously a linguistic 
                                                          
13  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 158-159. 
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gain.  But the more important matter is that it shows a person has made a great 
intellectual advance.  He can now think by putting together verbal signs of things that 
are not present to the senses and are not accompanied by any overt actions on his 
part.14 
 
This passage has importance in relation to Dewey’s logical theory insofar as predication 
is to be understood first in terms of overt action, and only later in relation to sentences.  
Words are first acquired by means of overt action in some particular context.  After the 
context has occurred, words are formed in sentences and linguistic expressions apart 
from overt actions or contexts.  In this sense, logic should be understood in relation to 
the natural environment, for it is within a particular context in the natural world that we 
begin to construct the rudimentary elements of our logical theories.   
 Furthermore, support that Dewey’s stance on propositions that they are context-
sensitive is revealed by Burke’s discussion of the different perspectives that knowledge 
of things can take.15  The facts of any given situation are contingent upon the perspective 
from which one is viewing the situation.  Burke provides the following example to 
illustrate this.  When sitting at one end of the table, the salt is to the left of the pepper, 
while sitting at the opposite side of the table, the salt is to the right.16  Dewey’s logical 
theory can accommodate the puzzle that arises from knowledge of basic propositions 
changing from perspective to perspective.  Burke argues for this position for the 
following reason, namely, that their accounts of propositions are intricately 
interconnected to their theories of knowledge.  
                                                          
14  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 159.  Burke cites this passage from Dewey to discuss Dewey’s 
commitment to a naturalistic account of logic.  I cite Dewey’s passage from Burke only because Burke 
proceeds to discuss Dewey’s account of logic as being naturalistic.  Also, see the original text, John 
Dewey. How We Think (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1933), 144-145. 
15  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 224. 
16 Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 224. 
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 Burke presents Russell’s theory of knowledge as Russell accepting atomic 
facts.17  Atomic facts are known when there is the apprehension of a fact or state of 
affairs of the actual world.18  Thus, the knowledge of the world that we acquire for 
Russell is unchanging knowledge, as facts and states of affairs of the world remain the 
same throughout time when and after they have taken place.  Thus, Burke’s point about 
Russell’s theory of knowledge is that, in relation to the salt shaker and pepper shaker 
example, when viewing them both from one side of the table the salt is to the left of the 
pepper, and this remains the same.  There is an objective fact about the matter that the 
salt is to the left of the pepper and it remains this way, as the structure of the situation 
(the order of the salt and pepper) corresponds to an objective state of affairs of the world.   
 Consequently, when moving to the other side of the table, the salt will be to the 
right of the pepper and the pepper to the left of the salt.  Thus, the fact about the location 
of the salt and pepper will have changed relative to the original perspective where it was 
being viewed.  Since the state of affairs of the world (the location of the salt and pepper 
relative to one another) will have changed, then it will raise the puzzle about what the 
objective state of affairs of the world is, since the state of affairs of the world will 
present two accounts of the location of the objects. 
                                                          
17  In Chapter V of his book, Burke maintains that perhaps Russell did not formulate a solidified theory of 
knowledge.  Even though I discuss Russell’s position as a theory of knowledge, I am not maintaining any 
solid stance on whether or not Russell in fact has a theory of knowledge.  Rather, I present it as a theory of 
knowledge just to illustrate that Russell’s and Dewey’s responses to the puzzle that arises when a 
proposition is viewed under a different context are contingent upon what they accept as constituting 
knowledge.  Thus, I refer to Russell’s position on knowledge as a theory of knowledge, even though the 
plausibility of whether Russell has a theory of knowledge may be under consideration. 
18  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 222. 
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 As I have illustrated throughout this chapter, Dewey, on the other hand, views 
propositions as instrumental tools in the process of inquiry.  Furthermore, there is always 
a unique context to every inquiry that takes place.  That is to say, every inquiry 
undergone is pervaded with unique contextual factors that make the particular inquiry 
unlike any other.  Since propositions take place within the process of inquiry and inquiry 
always occurs within a context, propositions, too, take place within a context.  
Furthermore, according to Dewey’s theory of knowledge, all knowledge is subject to 
revision.  He does not endorse an account of knowledge that regards knowledge of 
something as static and fixed.  Burke discusses this in Chapter V of his Dewey’s New 
Logic: 
    But another way to see the point about the changeability of knowledge is that we 
can take different perspectives on things, in different situations, and “know” them in 
different ways.  This is, for instance, at the root of Dewey’s manner of reconciling 
commonsense knowledge with scientific knowledge (of the very same things)–
namely, neither is more or less right than the other, but either is more or less 
appropriate to the perspective it assumes.  We “revise” knowledge in this sense by 
changing our perspective, not necessarily by falsifying previous beliefs.  This applies 
to what are taken to be “the facts” as much as to any respective hypothetical apparatus 
involved.  The facts in the one case are simply not facts in the other (which is not to 
say they are now false but simply that they are no longer part of the situation).19 
 
 The proposition ‘the salt is to the left of the pepper’ takes place, for Dewey, 
within the context of the inquiry taking place.  Since Dewey endorses an account of 
propositions that regards them as contextually-sensitive, when examining the salt and 
pepper at the opposite side of the table, he can accommodate the change in perspective 
of the proposition (i.e., the salt is now to the right of the pepper).  As a result of not 
endorsing a theory of knowledge that regards propositions about the world as 
                                                          
19  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 224. 
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corresponding to objective states of the world, Dewey can accommodate the puzzle that 
arises from the shift in perspective when the salt and pepper are viewed from the 
opposite side of the table.   
2.4 Russell’s Criticisms of Dewey’s Logic 
In Chapter V of his book Dewey’s New Logic, Tom Burke examines some of the 
arguments that Russell directed against Dewey’s theory of logic.  Some of the main 
criticisms that Russell directed against this area, Burke argues, stemmed from a 
misunderstanding of Dewey’s views.  In Chapter V, Burke diagnoses Russell’s 
criticisms as not having understood Dewey’s distinction between propositions and 
judgments.  In this section, I will discuss two of the criticisms brought forth by Burke 
against Russell’s writings on Dewey’s theory of inquiry. 
 The first criticism Burke raises against Russell is that he misunderstands 
Dewey’s distinction between propositions and judgments.  He does not understand what 
role propositions serve in the process of inquiry.  The following text by Russell indicates 
this:   
    Beliefs, we are now supposing, may be tested by their consequences, and may be 
considered to possess “warranted assertibility” when their consequences are of certain 
kinds.  The consequences to be considered relevant may be logical consequences only, 
or may be widened to embrace all kinds of effects; and between these two extremes 
any number of intermediate positions are possible.  In the case of the car that won’t 
go, you think it may be this, or it may be that, or it may be the other; if it is this and I 
do so-and-so and the car does not go; therefore it was not this.  But when I apply the 
same experimental procedure to the hypothesis that it was that, the car does go; 
therefore the belief that it was that has “warranted assertibility.”  So far, we have only 
the ordinary procedure of induction: “If p, then q; now q is true; therefore p is true.”  
E.g., “If pigs have wings, then some winged animals are good to eat; therefore pigs 
have wings.”  This form of inference is called “scientific method.”20 
                                                          
20  Russell, “Dewey’s New Logic,” 149. 
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Burke quotes this passage to show that Russell misinterprets Dewey’s views of inquiry 
in numerous places.  Russell attributes beliefs to the concept of warranted assertibility, 
which are not said to be judgments in Dewey’s view.  Judgments are said to be 
warrantably assertible or not, not beliefs.  Russell fails to recognize this distinction.  
Support for Burke’s view is evidenced by Dewey’s discussion of the ambiguity of the 
word ‘belief’ in Chapter 1 of his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.  Here, Dewey discusses 
exactly why belief cannot be designated the objective outcome of inquiry.  In other 
words, he discusses the reason that it cannot be identified with warranted assertibility.   
 Belief can be understood to be the settled outcome of inquiry.  It is the objective 
subject-matter that results from the process of inquiry.  However, in popular usage, 
belief can be understood as something that a person entertains or holds.  Because of the 
ambiguity that pervades this word, Dewey writes that it is not a suitable word to 
designate or to be substituted for warranted assertibility.  Dewey writes: “The ambiguity 
of the word thus renders its use inadvisable for the purpose in hand.”21  
 As noted earlier, Burke raises a second criticism against Russell concerning 
Dewey’s distinction between propositions and judgments.  The first point that Burke 
considers is that Dewey draws a distinction between the validity and invalidity of 
propositions in inquiry and the truth or falsity of propositions.22  Burke’s contention is 
supported by Dewey’s texts: 
    The view most current at the present time is probably that which regards 
propositions as the unitary material of logical theory.  Propositions upon this view 
                                                          
21  Dewey, Logic, 7. 
22  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 203. 
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have their defining property in the property of formal truth-falsity.  According to the 
position here taken, propositions are to be differentiated and identified on the ground 
of the function of their contents as means, procedural and material, further distinctions 
of forms of propositions being instituted on the ground of the special ways in which 
their respective characteristic subject-matters function as means.... [A]t this point it is 
pertinent to note that, since means as such are neither true nor false, truth-falsity is not 
a property of propositions.  Means are either effective or ineffective; pertinent or 
relevant; wasteful or economical, the criterion for the difference being found in the 
consequences with which they are connected as means.  On this basis, special 
propositions are valid (strong, effective) or invalid (weak, inadequate); loose or 
rigorous, etc.   
 Validity-invalidity is thus to be distinguished not only from truth-falsity but from 
formal correctness.  Any given proposition is such that it promotes or retards the 
institution of final resolution.  It cannot be logically adjudged, therefore, merely on the 
basis of its formal relations to other propositions.  The syllogism “All satellites are 
made of green cheese; the moon is a satellite; therefore, it is made of green cheese” is 
formally correct.  The propositions involved are, however, invalid, not just because 
they are “materially false,” but because instead of promoting inquiry they would, if 
taken and used, retard and mislead it.23 
 
Propositions, under Dewey’s account, are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness, based upon whether or not they contribute as means.  Dewey conceived 
of validity in terms of the strength of propositions.  Invalidity deals with the weakness or 
ineffectiveness of propositions.  The strength or weakness of propositions (validity or 
invalidity) is important insofar as they would assist in inquiry rather than deter it.   
 Dewey’s concern is that Russell overlooks this aspect of his account of 
propositions.  Russell assumes the Fregean view of propositions and reads this account 
into his interpretation of Dewey.  Consider the following passage by Dewey in support 
of his concern about Russell: 
The exclusive devotion of Mr. Russell to discourse is manifested in his assumption 
that propositions are the subject-matter of inquiry, a view assumed so unconsciously 
that it is taken for granted that Peirce and I likewise assume it.  But according to our 
view–and according to that of any thoroughgoing empiricist–things and events are the 
                                                          
23  Dewey, Logic, 287-288. 
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material and objects of inquiry, and propositions are means in inquiry, so that as 
conclusions of a given inquiry they become means of carrying on further inquiries.  
Like other means they are modified and improved in the course of use.  Given the 
beliefs (i) that propositions are from the start the objects of inquiry and (ii) that all 
propositions have either truth or falsity as their inherent property, and (iii) then read 
these two assumptions into theories–like Peirce’s and mine–which deny both of them, 
and the product is just the doctrinal confusion that Russell finds in what we have 
said.24 
 
For Dewey, objects and events are the concern of propositions, not the truth or falsity.  
Objects and events serve a role insofar as they carry on inquiry.  Given Russell’s 
conception of propositions, Dewey argues that it is clear that Russell misinterprets him.  
Russell assumes that propositions, for Dewey, are the starting points of inquiry and have 
a particular truth value.   
The place where Russell went wrong in interpreting Dewey in this passage is that 
he failed to realize that propositions serve an instrumental function in terms of bringing 
forth a warrantably assertible judgment.  Finally, the above quoted text, as Dewey 
argues, reveals that Russell assumes that the conception that he has of propositions 
applies to Dewey’s conception of propositions in his theory of inquiry (the mistake of 
inserting his own theory into Dewey’s).  
2.5 Russell’s Neglect of Context in Dewey’s Logic: A Criticism Against Russell 
While Burke provides an account of the context-sensitiveness of propositions, his 
discussion does not address every issue at stake.  Burke, accurately, argues that 
propositions for Dewey are context-sensitive, but he fails to continue this discussion as it 
relates to Russell’s interpretation of Dewey.  In this section, I will show that one of 
                                                          
24  John Dewey, “Experience, Knowledge and Value,” chap in The Philosophy of John Dewey (New York: 
Tudor Publishing, 1939), vol. 1, The Library of Living Philosophers, ed., Paul Arthur Schlipp, 573. 
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Russell’s primary misunderstandings of Dewey’s logic concerns the fact that Russell did 
not understand that propositions can change from context to context, meaning that truth 
values do not have a definite “truth or falsity” under many instances.  Russell neglected 
this aspect of Dewey’s thought, and as a consequence failed to come to an accurate 
presentation of Dewey’s logical theory. 
 Russell’s misinterpretation of Dewey’s account of propositions occurs in more 
than one place.  However, in one particular passage, the evidence is clear that he not 
only misunderstands Dewey’s account of inquiry but is criticizing Dewey for the role 
that propositions play in his account.  Russell presumes that propositions entail a definite 
truth value, so he fails to observe that they are context-sensitive and do not have a 
definite truth value.  Russell provides the following metaphor to attempt to capture 
Dewey’s account of inquiry: 
The position seems to be that there is a certain activity called “inquiry,” as 
recognizable as the activities of eating or drinking; like all activity, it is stimulated by 
discomfort, and the particular discomfort concerned is called “doubt,” just as hunger is 
the discomfort that stimulates eating, and thirst is the discomfort that stimulates 
drinking.  And as hunger may lead you to kill an animal, skin it, cook it, so that 
though you have been concerned with the same animal throughout, it is very different 
when it becomes food from what it was to begin with, so inquiry manipulates and 
alters its subject-matter until it becomes logically assimilable and intellectually 
appetizing.  Then doubt is allayed, at least for a time.  But the subject-matter of 
inquiry, like the wild boar of Valhalla, is perpetually reborn, and the operation of 
logical cooking has to be more delicately performed as the intellectual palate grows 
more refined.  There is therefore no end to the process of inquiry, and no dish that can 
be called “absolute truth.”25 
  
Russell appears to hold a preconceived notion of propositions throughout this passage, in 
which he appears to be criticizing Dewey’s account of inquiry at the end when he states, 
                                                          
25  Russell, “Dewey’s New Logic,” 147. 
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“and no dish that can be called ‘absolute truth’.”  Russell’s mistake at this point is 
assuming that his views of propositions must also apply to Dewey’s account. 
 The following passage is another instance in which Russell seems to presuppose 
that Dewey has a similar theory of logic as his own: 
Inquiry uses “assertions” as it tools, and assertions are “warranted” in so far as they 
produce the desired results.  But in inquiry, as in any other practical operation, better 
tools may, from time to time, be invented, and the old ones are then discarded.  
Indeed, just as machines can enable us to make better machines, so the temporary 
results of an inquiry may be the very means which lead to better results.  In this 
process there is no finality, and therefore no assertion is warranted for all time, but 
only at a given stage of inquiry.  “Truth” as a static concept is therefore to be 
discarded.26 
 
This passage reveals the extent to which Russell presupposes that Dewey must accept a 
similar view of logic as his own.  In particular, his final statement illustrates this clearly: 
“‘Truth’ as a static concept is therefore to be discarded.”  Russell presupposes that his 
account of propositions (they are true or false) should be incorporated into other views 
on logic, as he notes that it is not incorporated into Dewey’s account. 
 Dewey regards propositions, as I’ve shown, as concerned with context-
sensitivity.  Russell continuously presupposes that other logicians should develop logics 
that are similar in content to his.  However, for Dewey, propositions depend upon the 
context in which they occur, and do not assume a fixed truth value across time.  As a 
result of his many divergences from Dewey, Russell’s criticisms against Dewey do not 
fully capture the points that Dewey was trying to make
                                                          
26  Bertrand Russell, “Warranted Assertibility,” in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company), 401. 
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CHAPTER III 
BURKE ON DEWEY ON EVOLUTION 
 In his book Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell, Tom Burke discusses 
Dewey’s logical theory from the standpoint of the debate that took place between 
Russell and Dewey.  Burke provides an insightful and informative picture of the world 
of Dewey’s logical writings, as well as in-depth.  While his book is of first-rate quality, 
there are a few aspects that are in need of critical examination.   
 Burke discusses Dewey’s account of situations from an evolutionary perspective.  
Even though Dewey thought evolution would have a major impact on future sciences 
and philosophies of nature, he did not, however, reserve a place for evolution in his 
logical theory.  Dewey argues that the biological has an important function in the 
foundations for his theory of inquiry.  However, it would have been more appropriate for 
Dewey to use the term ‘physiological’ based on the ideas he is conveying.   
 The distinction between physiology and biology resides in the nature of what 
they study.  Human physiology studies the functions of the human body.  The human 
body is composed of organs and the composition of different organs comprise different 
systems of the body (for instance, the skeletal system and the muscular system).1  
Biology, however, is concerned with studying the nature of life in all its different 
manifestations.  The study of biology takes evolution as the starting principle for 
explaining the nature of human life, for consider this passage from a biology textbook: 
                                                          
1  Ruth L. Memmler. The Structure & Function of the Human Body, 7th ed.  
(Philadelphia:  Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2000), 3. 
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“To understand life one must understand and appreciate how evolution takes place.”2  
Whereas biology takes evolution as an underlying principle of its study of different life 
forms, physiology does not assume any theory about the origins of life to describe the 
organs or systems that it is exploring. 
 In this chapter, I will begin with an examination of Dewey’s evolutionary views.  
Following this, I will turn to an examination of Chapter II of his Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry to reveal what role the biological, or what I interpret to be the physiological, 
serves in his account of logic.  Afterwards, I will discuss Burke’s emphasis on the role of 
evolution in relation to Dewey’s discussion of situations.  Then, I will argue against this 
interpretation.  I will claim that Burke inserts an evolutionary theory into his reading of 
Dewey’s account of situations.  Instead of being concerned with evolution, I will argue 
that Dewey is more concerned with describing the experiential and social aspects of 
inquiry.  Dewey accomplishes this in two ways, including: (i) his emphasis on the 
postulate of immediate empiricism, and (ii) the role that social interactions play in his 
theory of inquiry. 
 Burke’s evolutionary interpretation is certainly insightful and informative.  
However, his interpretation is not in accordance with Dewey’s postulate of immediate 
empiricism, according to which we are to take our experience as our starting point for 
inquiry, and his emphasis on the social foundations of inquiry, according to which 
humans’ cultures exert a great amount of control over our backgrounds and 
development. 
                                                          
2  Timothy H. Goldsmith and William F. Zimmerman.  Biology, Evolution, and Human Nature (Danvers: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001), 19. 
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3.1 Dewey’s Discussion of Evolution 
In his The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy, Dewey discusses the importance of 
Charles Darwin’s publication of the “Origin of Species” on the natural sciences.  Dewey 
begins by noting that prior to Darwin’s publication, nature was regarded as fixed and 
final; it was concerned with permanency.  Change and origin were treated as signs of 
defects.  Darwin’s publication, Dewey argues, would alter the conceptions of nature and 
morals that previously reigned. 
 The usage of the word ‘species’, Dewey notes, goes back to the time of the 
scholastics.  Extremely impressed by the characteristic traits of the life of the plants and 
animals during their time, the ancient Greeks made these traits the way of defining 
nature and explaining society.3  The Greeks thought that an understanding of the mystery 
of life might lead them to believe that the key to the nature of the universe (including the 
heaven and earth) was within their reach.4  Their approach to understanding the mystery 
of life lay primarily in their understanding of the word species. 
 Dewey presents a historical discussion of the conception of nature that dominated 
prior to Darwin’s publication in order to reveal the meaning behind the title “The Origin 
of Species.” Dewey tells a story of how the ancient Greeks arrived at their conception of 
nature, and how this led to their definition of the word ‘species’.  The story will be told 
from Dewey’s standpoint. 
 The ancient Greeks were impressed with and persistent upon understanding the 
nature of life.  They observed that seeds and eggs were passive and inactive.  Through 
                                                          
3  The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed., John J. McDermott, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” 
(Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 33. 
4  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 33. 
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time, however, these seeds and eggs underwent rapid and drastic changes in size, shape, 
and qualities.  These perceived changes were orderly; they were working towards 
fulfilling a purpose.  Non-living things (such as burning wood) were not directed 
towards some final goal; they were not in a state of realization or fulfillment of purpose.   
 The changes taking place in living things were fixed and orderly.  Changes that 
occurred in living organisms preserved the net effects of previous changes and prepared 
for future activities.5  These changes did not cease until there was a completed end.  The 
principle that functioned through changes and held things to a fixed course was referred 
to as species.6  The depth of the term was increased in its application to everything that 
observed order amidst the state of flux.  Realization of purpose in nature is comparable 
to the realization of purpose in living organisms, such as plants and animals.  In other 
words, like plants and animals, nature strives towards the fulfillment of an end.  
 The conception of species that dominated the Greek era was exhibited in their 
understanding of not only nature but also knowledge.7  The ancient Greeks regarded 
change alone without knowledge as flux, and for the ancient Greeks this “insulted 
intelligence.”8  Dewey expresses this position as follows: “The conception of eidos, 
species, a fixed form and final cause, was the central principle of knowledge as well as 
of nature.  Upon it rested the logic of science.  Change as change is mere flux and lapse; 
                                                          
5  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 33. 
6  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 34. 
7  Even though Dewey attributes this conception of species to the ancient Greeks, he does not, however, 
specify exactly which of the ancient Greek philosophers he is referring.  I speculate, however, that some of 
these philosophers would include Parmenides and Plato. 
8  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 34. 
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it insults intelligence.”9  Knowledge that is fully attained (is genuine, as Dewey phrases 
it) is cognized through changes, where changes are viewed as necessary elements for 
arriving at knowledge that is permanent.  Dewey expresses this position in the following 
way: “Genuinely to know is to grasp a permanent end that realizes itself through 
changes, holding them thereby within the metes and bounds of fixed truth.”10   
Attaining complete, unalterable knowledge consisted of relating everything to 
their end, which is “pure intelligence,” for Dewey writes: “Completely to know is to 
relate all special forms to their one single end and good: pure contemplative 
intelligence.”11  Attaining knowledge consisted of grasping some fixed end, which was 
characterized as reaching unalterable truth.  Since nature is in a constant state of flux, the 
conditions of attaining knowledge cannot be reached through understanding nature.  Our 
experience of the world is mediated through our sensory and perceptual apparatuses, 
which are subject to change and flux.  Thus, observation and experimentation are subject 
to fallibility.   
 There were others, Dewey notes, who questioned this conception of nature before 
Darwin entered the picture.  During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the physical 
sciences were going through a revolution.  Galileo furthered this transition from interest 
in the permanent and unchanging to the conception that viewed nature as consisting of 
flux and indeterminacy.  If it were not for certain important scientific figures, Darwin’s 
account of nature would never have been formulated.  Among these scientists are 
Kepler, Galileo, and Copernicus.  Dewey argues that the importance of Darwin on 
                                                          
9  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 34. 
10  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 34. 
11  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 34. 
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philosophy resides in breaking up the ancient Greek view and furthering the importance 
of the role of transition in accounting for natural phenomena.12  Doing this opened the 
way for understanding morals and the nature of the mind in a new light.   
 As a side note, however, not all of the ancient Greeks endorsed the traditional 
view of nature.  Heraclitus, for instance, rejected the thesis that the world was in a 
permanent state of Being, and accepted the world of Becoming, by which everything in 
the material world is in a constant state of flux and change.13  Reality does not possess 
any stable and unalterable characteristics.  Consider Heraclitus’ writings: “All things 
come into being through opposition, and all are in flux like a river.”14   
 Heraclitus posited fire as the single principle from which everything in the 
universe originates (and is in perpetual change itself), for the following text is attributed 
to him: “All comes from fire and to fire it shall return.”15 Thus, unlike other philosophers 
during his time, such as Parmenides, Heraclitus did not posit the existence of any world 
other than the constantly changing material world.  As a result of this, Heraclitus would 
be an exception to the ancient Greek philosophers Dewey is describing. 
 Despite the fact that there were people questioning the philosophy that dated to 
the ancient Greeks, this philosophy still remained the primary one in Europe for over 
two thousand years.16  Dewey connects this philosophy to the argument from design.  
                                                          
12  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 35. 
13  This is the traditional reading of Heraclitus’ writings.  I will not address any of the current debates 
taking place on whether or not Heraclitus actually endorsed a philosophy of nature that only reserved a 
place for regarding nature as concerned with change and rejected altogether the possibility of permanency 
with respect to nature.   
14  Heraclitus Fr. 3 in Louis P. Pojman, ed., Classics of Philosophy, Vol. I: Ancient and Medieval (New 
York: Oxford, 1998), 12. 
15 Heraclitus Fr. 7 in ibid., 13. 
16  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 36. 
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The main strength of this argument was the detailed knowledge of plants and animals.  
Many factors during the day added to the progress of the sciences of zoology, botany, 
and embryology, including: the amazing ability that plants have to adapt to their 
environment, the ability that organs have to adapt to organisms, and complex parts of the 
organism to the organism as a whole.17  Taken collectively, these sciences added so 
substantially to the argument from design that by the eighteenth century this argument 
was the focal point for all theistic philosophy. 
 Darwin’s philosophy, with the principle of natural selection, was a sharp 
opposition to the argument from design.  If the world is as Darwin envisioned it, there is 
no causal preordained force to create nature and human life.  According to the Darwinian 
picture, all organic adaptations are due to constant variation.  Furthermore, any 
variations that are harmful in the struggle for existence are eliminated.  Some people 
criticized this as downright materialism, and attributed Darwin’s theories to making 
chance the cause of everything in the universe.18 
 Darwin’s new outlook, Dewey argues, introduces responsibility into life.  If the 
world is conceived of as fixed from the start and there is no place for chance to occur, 
then there is no responsibility placed upon each person for their actions.  The philosophy 
of nature that preceded Darwin placed responsibility onto some transcendental force 
rather than the individual.  Philosophy must, Dewey argues, produce a method for 
                                                          
17  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 37. 
18  Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism in Philosophy,” 37. 
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locating and handling the conflicts that occur in everyday life for individuals, including 
moral and political life.   
 Finally, Dewey writes that old ideas give way slowly.  These old ideas become 
habits and predispositions that form and ingrain our attitudes and beliefs.  Old questions 
disappear and fade from existence.  New questions corresponding to the new material 
which has replaced the old receive preference.  By writing such phrases, Dewey is 
observing that the previous philosophies of nature (the ancient Greeks) are replaced once 
new philosophies of nature have been introduced (Darwin’s, in this case).  Dewey’s 
belief in the future success of Darwin’s evolutionary theory is expressed in the following 
text by Dewey: “Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old 
questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the 
one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the ‘Origin of 
Species’.”19 
3.2 The Biological Foundations of Inquiry 
The preceding discussion illustrates that Dewey recognizes evolution as a science that 
will have an impact on the development of future sciences and philosophies of nature.  
Having explored some of his writings on evolution, I will turn to his theory of inquiry to 
determine what role evolution has in this.  In his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey 
expresses his view that logic is naturalistic.  What does Dewey mean by the term 
‘naturalistic’?  I will examine this question in this section.   In addition, I will provide a 
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discussion of what role the physiological, or what Dewey terms the ‘biological’, plays in 
his logic.  
 In Chapter I, Dewey discusses the various meanings of the word ‘naturalistic’.  
According to the first sense, it means, on the one hand, there is no break in continuity 
between inquiry and biological and physical operations.  That is, included in the 
foundations of inquiry are biological and physical operations.  There is a close 
interconnection between the two.  On the other hand, it means that inquiry (rational 
operations) is not identical with biological and physical operations.  Inquiry grows out of 
organic activities, but is not identical with them.  Another use of the word regards logic 
as naturalistic in the sense that it is concerned with the observable insofar as inquiry 
involves observation and resolution of problems in the natural environment.   
 In relation to his discussion of the different usages of ‘naturalistic’, Dewey writes 
that inquiry is not naturalistic in the sense that humans can be reduced to apes or 
amoebae.  Dewey indicates one of the ambiguities surrounding the word ‘naturalistic’ in 
the following text: “One ambiguity attending the word ‘naturalistic’ is that it may be 
understood to involve reduction of human behavior to the behavior of apes, amoebae, or 
electrons or protons.”20  By writing this statement, Dewey is expressing his view that 
human behavior cannot be understood within a framework that reduces human behavior 
to animals or physical particles.  Human behavior cannot be understood from a 
reductionistic scientific perspective.   
                                                          
20  Dewey, Logic, 26. 
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Rather, humans are social creatures, meaning they have languages, cultures, and 
live in communities.  Dewey discusses humans and their relationship to their cultures as 
follows: “But man is naturally a being that lives in association with others in 
communities possessing language, and therefore enjoying a transmitted culture.  Inquiry 
is a mode of activity that is socially conditioned and has cultural consequences.”21  
Humans, by their nature, have the need to socialize and form groups of communities.  
Thus, Dewey uses the word ‘naturalistic’ in multiple ways, none of which include 
explaining humans in a reductionistic physical language.   
 For Dewey, biological functions occupy a fundamental role in his theory of 
inquiry.  He addresses this in Chapter II, “The Existential Matrix of Inquiry: Biological,” 
of his Logic: “This chapter and the following one are occupied with development of the 
statement that logic is naturalistic.  The present chapter is concerned with the biological 
natural foundations of inquiry.”22  The biological organs that assist us in the process of 
inquiry, including eyes, nose, and ears, are necessary conditions for inquiry.  Inquiry 
could not take place without biological functions and operations.   
Since this is Dewey’s primary thesis in this chapter, it would have been more 
appropriate for Dewey to term it the ‘physiological foundations’ of inquiry.  The term 
‘biology’ carries the connotations of evolution, but Dewey does not discuss this in 
Chapter II of his book.  From hereafter in this essay, I will use the biological 
terminology to refer to the biological foundations of inquiry, only because those are 
terms Dewey uses. 
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 One of the primary postulates of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity 
between the lower and higher activities.  It precludes the possibility for there to be 
reduction of the higher to the lower.  By continuity, Dewey is referring to something 
akin to the growth of an organism from seed to maturity.23  According to Dewey, what is 
excluded from the postulate of continuity is the possibility of an outside force causing 
the changes that occur in some living organism.  Dewey’s theory requires that nothing 
can be introduced ad hoc to explain the cause of something.  Anything that is explaining 
the cause of something must already have been proven to exist in nature before it can be 
introduced into any theory to explain something else.  Dewey discusses this position in 
the following text: 
What is excluded by the postulate of continuity is the appearance upon the scene of a 
totally new outside force as a cause of changes that occur.  Perhaps from mutations 
that are due to some form of radio-activity a strikingly new form emerges.  But radio-
activity is not invented ad hoc and introduced from without in order to account for 
such transformation.  It is first known to exist in nature, and then, if this particular 
theory of the origin of mutations is confirmed, is found actually to occur in biological 
phenomena and to be operative among them in observable and describable fashion.24 
  
Dewey relates the postulate of continuity to the discussion of logic by stating that we 
cannot evoke a new faculty like Reason or Intuition in order to account for logical 
subject-matter.25  In other words, anything that is used to account for logical subject-
matter must already have been observed to exist.    
 Following this discussion, Dewey discusses the relationship between the 
organism and its environment.  The organism and environment are intimately 
interconnected.  In other words, the organism does not live as an isolated entity detached 
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24  Dewey, Logic, 31. 
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from its environment.  Rather, the organism’s survival is directly contingent upon its 
surroundings.  The organism is directly integrated into its environment.  Dewey 
discusses organisms and their relationship to their environment in the following passage: 
    Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity that involves an 
environment.  It is a transaction extending beyond the spatial limits of the organism.  
An organism does not live in an environment; it lives by means of an environment.  
Breathing, the ingestion of food, the ejection of waste products, are cases of direct 
integration; the circulation of the blood and the energizing of the nervous system are 
relatively indirect.26 
 
Each type of organism, according to Dewey, has its own type of environment that it 
depends upon.  Fish require a different environment in order to survive than does a bird.  
The type of environment that the organism requires depends upon its physiological 
constitution.   
 An organism is the type that it is, Dewey argues, because of the environment that 
it inhabits.  If it lived in a different environment, then it would be a different type of 
organism.  Dewey expresses this thus: 
    It follows that with every differentiation of structure the environment expands.  For 
a new organ provides a new way of interacting in which things in the world that were 
previously indifferent enter into life-functions.  The environment of an animal that is 
locomotor differs from that of a sessile plant; that of a jelly fish differs from that of a 
trout, and the environment of any fish differs from that of a bird.  So, to repeat what 
was just said, the difference is not just that a fish lives in the water and a bird in the 
air, but that the characteristic functions of these animals are what they are because of 
the special way in which water and air enter into their respective activities.27 
 
 The relationship between the organism and its environment can be 
misunderstood by thinking that the organism and its environment are independent of one 
another, and that the interaction spoken of is something that is a third factor.  Interaction 
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exists insofar as organisms and their environment are naturally connected and 
interrelated.  There is no third factor that mediates their connection.  There is a natural 
world that exists independently of the organism, but it becomes an environment, a 
natural world in which organic interactions take place, when life-forms enter and 
function in the environment.  Living organisms bring the environment into existence by 
their presence.  Dewey discusses organisms as follows: 
Unfortunately, however, a special philosophical interpretation may be unconsciously 
read into the common sense distinction.  It will then be supposed that organism and 
environment are “given” as independent things and interaction is a third independent 
thing which finally intervenes.  In fact, the distinction is a practical and temporal one, 
arising out of the state of tension in which the organism at a given time, in a given 
phase of life-activity, is set over against the environment as it then and there exists.  
There is, of course, a natural world that exists independently of the organism, but this 
world is environment only as it enters directly and indirectly into life-functions.  The 
organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only in 
active connections with its environment.28  
 
 Given that there is an interconnected relationship between organisms and their 
environments, there is a need, then, for a balance to be maintained between them.  There 
has to be a mechanism, Dewey argues, that can respond to the variations that occur in 
the organism and in its environment.  The result of an organism continuously 
maintaining a balance with its environment is a stable integration that results between 
them.  Inanimate things do not integrate themselves with their environments.  They do 
not have to continuously retain a balance with their surroundings.  Dewey provides the 
example of a hammer breaking a stone into bits.  Both the hammer and the stones are 
inanimate, and lack any organic functions and structures.  Consequently, there will not 
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be a need for them to maintain a balance with one another, since neither the hammer nor 
the stones have organic functions.   
 When disturbance does occur, there is need exhibited to resolve the conflict and 
restore equilibrium to the situation.  The more structures there are, the harder it becomes 
to maintain a balanced environment.  A more complex organism will experience greater 
disturbances and will exert more energy to restore a balance between itself and the 
environment.  Recognizing the need for restoration, initiating the process, and resolving 
the situation into a balanced one constitute the process of inquiry for Dewey.  Resolving 
the situation into a determinate one (that is, a balanced relationship between the 
organism and its environment) results in a state of fulfillment and satisfaction.29 
3.3 A Criticism of Burke’s Account of Situations 
In this section, I will turn to a reflection on Burke’s discussion of Dewey’s notion of a 
situation.  It has become characteristic of many philosophers nowadays to insert their 
own theories into their readings of other people.  Turning to Burke’s account of 
situations to delineate it is important for examining the emphasis he places on the role of 
evolution in his writings.  In what ensues, I will examine this emphasis as it occurs in his 
Dewey’s New Logic. 
 In Chapter II of his book, Burke discusses his understanding of a situation for 
Dewey.  Burke defines it in the following way: “Situations, occurring in the ongoing 
activities of some given organism/environment system, are instances or episodes (or 
‘fields’) of disequilibrium, instability, imbalance, disintegration, disturbance, 
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dysfunction, breakdown, etc.”30  For Burke, situations, then, occur when a dysfunction 
or breakdown in the environment takes place between the organism and its environment.  
However, in writing of situations in such a manner, Burke discusses these terms which 
he uses to describe situations as though Dewey is coming from an evolutionary 
perspective in his introduction of the terms ‘situations’, ‘organisms’, and ‘environment’. 
 Burke proceeds from discussing what he conceives situations to be for Dewey to 
discussing how the aforementioned terms can be applied to any organism and 
environment in evolutionary complexity.  Thus, he intertwines evolution into Dewey’s 
presentation of situations.  Consider the following passage by Burke in support of my 
contention:  
These terms [the terms he uses to describe situations] should apply to a wide range of 
organism/environment systems at virtually any level of evolutionary complexity.  
Inquiry, in a common mentalistic sense of the term, should be viewed as an 
evolutionary variation on what originally appears as an innate impulse of 
organism/environment systems to transform situations so as to counteract such 
instabilities.31    
 
Another place where Burke discusses situations in such a manner is when he 
discusses situations as “remaining on a relatively abstract level, though focusing initially 
on biological and ecological considerations.”32  In discussing how organisms have the 
need to transform a situation from an indeterminate to a determinate one, Burke argues 
that this process appears as an “evolutionary variation” on inquiry.  This is an instance 
where Burke discusses inquiry in terms of evolutionary terminology.   
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 In Chapter II of his Logic, Dewey discusses the extent to which biology, or what 
I have called physiology, plays a role in his theory of inquiry.  To reiterate, biology is 
important in his theory of inquiry insofar as biological operations are necessary 
conditions for the process of inquiry.  However, Dewey never discusses evolution in 
relation to this theory.  Dewey simply expresses his view that in order for inquiry to 
occur, an organism must have the appropriate organs in order for observation and 
operation on the environment to take place.  The terminology ‘organisms’ and 
‘environments’ are words that are used to describe the notions he is trying to convey.  
Why does Burke assume that Dewey, in using the words ‘organism’ and ‘environment’, 
is presupposing the truth of some evolutionary theory or outlook?   
 Despite Dewey’s emphasis in his “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy” that 
evolution may have an impact on future sciences, he never explicitly accepts this 
scientific theory.  Furthermore, he never discusses evolution in relation to his account of 
situations.  In discussing situations, his intention is to describe experience as it is had.  
Dewey is committed to the postulate of immediate empiricism, and he is using the 
terminology of ‘organisms’ and ‘environments’ as an alternative to the subject-object 
dualism picture of experience.  It is a way to use terms that emphasize that experience is 
a transaction, and not a passive subject but an engaged organism.  A major way in which 
organisms are engaged are through social foundations. 
3.4 The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism and the Social Foundations of Inquiry 
In this section, I will discuss two aspects of Dewey’s philosophy: (i) his postulate of 
immediate empiricism and (ii) his view that inquiry is social in nature.  This 
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interpretation is intended as an alternative to Burke’s evolutionary account.  I will begin 
by showing how Dewey is committed to the postulate of immediate empiricism.  
Afterwards, I will emphasis that not only is inquiry concerned with biology but also has 
social foundations.  In other words, organisms have languages, cultures, and shared 
communities.   
 In an article entitled “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” Dewey writes 
that the topic of the article is immediate empiricism.  According to immediate 
empiricism, we should begin with how we experience objects and events as a way of 
describing the world.  Rather than abstracting oneself from one’s present context, one 
should take as their starting-point their experiences.  Dewey provides the example of a 
horse to illustrate this.  If a horse is to be described, then whoever it is who wants it to be 
described, whether it is the statesman, horse-dealer, or family man, will describe the 
horse as they experience the horse.  If their accounts differ in fundamental respects, then 
there is no reason to assume that one account is more real and the other more 
“phenomenal.”   
Each account that is provided of the horse will illustrate what the horse is 
experienced as for the statesman, or horse-dealer, or family man.  In other words, the 
accounts of how each person experiences the horse are equally as real.  Every account 
provides an equally real and determinate experience.  Dewey discusses determinate 
experiences as follows:  “In each case, the nub of the question is, what sort of experience 
is meant or indicated: a concrete and determinate experience, varying, when it varies, in 
specific real elements, and agreeing, when it agrees, in specific real elements, so that we 
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have a contrast, not between a Reality, and various approximations to, or phenomenal 
representations of Reality, but between different reals of experience.”33 
 According to the postulate of immediate empiricism, knowledge of Reality 
cannot be attained by an all-competent all-knower.  Knowledge is only one type of 
experience, and the postulate of immediate empiricism reveals the experiences 
associated with knowing.  An erroneous assumption, from the immediatist’s standpoint, 
is to assume that things are what they are known as from the standpoint of someone with 
knowledge.  Making this assumption leaves out of account how the knowledge 
standpoint is experienced.  
 To illustrate this, Dewey provides an example of a noise heard flustering 
someone.  From an empirical standpoint, the noise is fearsome.   The actual noise really 
does startle the person.  It is not an illusion.  The noise is experienced as fearsome. 
However, when the noise is experienced as an object of knowledge, then it is no longer 
fearsome.  When the tapping noise is realized to be a window shade tapping against the 
window, the frightful experience no longer takes place.  The prior fearsome experience 
is now experienced as an object of knowledge, that is, as a non-fearsome window shade 
tapping against the window.  The only that thing has changed, Dewey writes, is the 
experience.  The truth of the matter has not changed.  Dewey says the immediatist must 
ask how the frightful noise is experienced.  Is it experienced as I-know-I-am-frightened, 
or I-am-frightened?  According to Dewey, it must be expressed as the former phrase.
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 Dewey summarizes his position in this essay by stating that the postulate of 
immediate empiricism is a particular method for doing philosophical analysis.  The 
method is to take experience as the starting-point for doing philosophy.  In order to find 
out what any philosophical term means (for example, substance, justice, genus, self), 
examining how it is experienced as is the method to apply.   
Discussing the postulate of immediate empiricism is intended to illustrate the 
importance that Dewey places on our experience as a starting-point.  Under this account, 
the physical language that is used to describe evolution cannot describe the way that 
something is experienced.  A person’s experience of something, such as a glass of cold 
water on a hot day, cannot be captured in physical language.  For Dewey, it is something 
that must be experienced.  Thus, for Dewey, there is more to life and inquiry than 
biological and physical language.   
Humans’ experiences contain an aspect that can only be captured from a first-
person experiential standpoint, not from a detached, scientific outlook.  The standpoint 
that evolution presupposes is that of a detached observer, examining organisms from a 
distance.  A standpoint such as this cannot coalesce with Dewey’s postulate of 
immediate empiricism, which he describes as a method of philosophical analysis that 
begins with our experience of the world. 
 While Dewey does acknowledge that inquiry is biological in nature, Dewey also 
holds that human beings are social creatures.  In other words, the environment in which 
human beings live is not entirely physical.  The environment is also cultural.  When an 
indeterminate situation arises, biological as well as cultural factors work to resolve the 
  
49
situation into a determinate one. Thus, for Dewey, biology and culture play important 
roles in the process of inquiry.  Consider how Dewey discusses culture in the following 
text: 
    The environment in which human beings live, act and inquire, is not simply 
physical.  It is cultural as well.  Problems which induce inquiry grow out of the 
relations of fellow beings to one another, and the organs for dealing with these 
relations are not only the eye and ear, but the meanings which have developed in the 
course of living, together with the ways of forming and transmitting culture with all its 
constituents of tools, arts, institutions, traditions and customary beliefs.34 
 
 Typical behaviors of human beings are cultural in nature.  Human beings listen to 
music, dance, cook food, and sit around the fire and talk.  These behaviors are cultural 
and social in nature, and, Dewey argues, cultural activities are more common than ones 
that are physical reactions to physical affairs, such as jumping at a sudden noise.35  
Furthermore, our reactions to the physical environment are seriously influenced and 
affected by our cultural environment.  The physical environment is understood by means 
of our cultural orientations.  In the following passage, Dewey discusses the relationship 
between the physical and the cultural:  “Of distinctively human behavior it may be said 
that the strictly physical environment is so incorporated in a cultural environment that 
our interactions with the former, the problems that arise with reference to it, and our 
ways of dealing with these problems, are profoundly affected by incorporation of the 
physical environment in the cultural.”36 
 Given that man is social by nature, interactions with others in the environment 
present human beings with situations that do not have biological solutions.  The 
                                                          
34  Dewey, Logic, 48. 
35  Dewey, Logic, 48. 
36  Dewey, Logic, 49.   
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solutions that are required originate from the customs, traditions, and values that have 
impacted human beings through interactions with others.  Human beings’ actions, 
decisions, and behaviors are deeply influenced by their cultures, traditions, and 
institutions.  Thus, human beings are more social than other animals, such as a bee or an 
ant, because human beings’ environments are inherited from previous cultures.  
According to Dewey, even humans’ neuro-muscular structures are modified and develop 
from the natural environment.  Dewey discusses man and his relationship to his cultural 
environment in Chapter III of his Logic: 
    Man, as Aristotle remarked, is a social animal.  This fact introduces him into 
situations and originates problems and ways of solving them that have no precedent 
upon the organic biological level.  For man is social in another sense than the bee and 
ant, since his activities are encompassed in an environment that is culturally 
transmitted, so that what man does and how he acts, is determined not by organic 
structure and physical heredity alone but by the influence of cultural heredity, 
embedded in traditions, institutions, customs and the purposes and beliefs they both 
carry and inspire.  Even the neuro-muscular structures of individuals are modified 
through the influence of the cultural environment upon the activities performed.37 
 
 Finally, Dewey writes that any theory that incorporates a naturalistic element 
must account for how human beings differ so markedly from other animals.  Humans 
have such different activities and operations that demarcate them so starkly from other 
non-human creatures.   Dewey argues in Chapter III of his Logic that the development of 
language out of prior biological activities is what led to this demarcation.  Consider how 
Dewey expresses this in the following text:   
Any theory that rests upon a naturalistic postulate must face the problem of the 
extraordinary differences that mark off the activities and achievements of human 
beings from those of other biological forms.  It is these differences that have led to the 
idea that man is completely separated from other animals by properties that come from 
                                                          
37  Dewey, Logic, 49. 
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a non-natural source.  The conception to be developed in the present chapter is that the 
development of language (in its widest sense) out of prior biological activities is, in its 
connection with wider cultural forces, the key to this transformation.  The problem, so 
viewed, is not the problem of the transition of organic behavior into something wholly 
discontinuous with it—as is the case when, for example, Reason, Intuition and the A 
priori are appealed to for explanation of the difference.  It is a special form of the 
general problem of continuity of change and the emergence of new modes of 
activity—the problem of development at any level.38 
 
Furthermore, this passage reveals that there is a factor other than biology that demarcates 
humans from non-humans.  That is to say, an interpretation of the origins of humans that 
is strictly evolutionary, meaning that they evolved from non-human animals, could not 
account for this other factor (language) that differentiate humans from animals that are 
not human.  This other factor, language, prevents the possibility of a simple 
classification of the origins of humans.  The problem that arises with respect to the 
development of something non-natural out of the natural is similar to trying to account 
for development at whenever it takes place—that is, there is continuity between different 
levels that seem unaccountable.  Trying to account for the development of language out 
of biological processes is difficult because the development that takes place is hard to 
explain.
                                                          
38  Dewey, Logic, 49-50. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BROWNING ON DEWEY 
 In Chapter II of his book Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell, Tom Burke 
provides an intensive discussion on Dewey’s notion of a situation and how this relates to 
the Dewey-Russell debate on logic.  Burke’s account of Dewey’s notion of a situation 
has been criticized by some scholars.  In this book, Burke’s intention is to defend Dewey 
against many criticisms brought forth by Russell against Dewey’s logical theory.  
Burke’s intention, then, is not to assist Russell in furthering the criticisms against 
Dewey.  Rather, Burke’s intention is to capture most accurately Dewey’s writings.  
 A presentation delivered by Douglas Browning entitled “Some Remarks on 
Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic” discusses Burke’s account of a situation that he provides 
in Chapter II of his book, and proceeds to develop an alternative account.  Browning’s 
interpretation provides a way of escaping several of the criticisms that Russell targets at 
Dewey.  Although Burke’s understanding does rescue Dewey from a number of the 
criticisms brought forth against him by Russell, the criticisms of Russell’s interpretation 
of Dewey cannot be revealed through Burke’s understanding alone.  To show this, we 
need Browning’s understanding to reveal these consequences.  In addition to rescuing 
Dewey of some of Russell’s arguments, Browning’s discussion of Dewey’s account of a 
situation appears more in accordance with Dewey’s actual writings.  In other words, the 
discussion of a situation that Dewey provides parallels Browning’s account more than it 
does Burke’s.   
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 In discussing Browning’s development of situations, I trust to show that the role 
of the situation in Dewey’s logical theory is quite complex and has many subtle 
intricacies.  Russell, unfortunately, moved too forcefully and swiftly through his 
discussion and presentation of Dewey’s logical writings, and, as a result, failed to 
capture a clear understanding of Dewey’s theory of inquiry.  
 In this chapter, I will begin by discussing the criticisms that Russell raised 
against Dewey’s account of situations.  Afterwards, I will formulate Browning’s 
criticisms of Burke’s understanding of the role of situations in Dewey’s work and, 
finally, show how Browning’s discussion of a situation can rescue Dewey from some of 
Russell’s criticisms against him.  My intention is to use Browning’s notion of a situation 
to reveal how Russell’s understanding of Dewey’s view of situations is not quite 
accurate.  By doing this, I will show that the role of situations in Dewey’s logic can only 
be understood from a perspective that emphasizes them as they are had and felt and 
cannot be defined.1 
4.1 Russell’s Interpretation of Dewey’s Notion of a Situation 
The debate that took place between Dewey and Russell came from Russell’s side in 
which he targeted many criticisms against Dewey.  In his book (1994), Burke attempts to 
defend Dewey against these criticisms brought forth by Russell.  Burke’s task is to sort 
through the confusions and misinterpretations brought forth by Russell.  Russell claims 
                                                          
1  I will not propose to define a situation, as Burke does.  Instead, I will present Dewey’s discussion of a 
situation.  I intend to show that the role of the situation in Dewey’s logical theory is intricate insofar as it 
cannot be defined or placed within a set of boundaries.  It is a subtle and complex notion, and the farthest 
that Dewey goes is describing what a situation is, but never proposing a definition of any sorts.  I hope to 
restore this understanding of Dewey’s discussion of situations.   
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that Dewey’s embracement of a holism commits him to the conclusion that a situation 
must embrace no less than the whole universe.  Russell, however, did not fully capture 
Dewey’s notion of a situation.  Consequently, in his book (1994), Burke turns to the 
debate that took place between Dewey and Russell, and examines more closely what he 
thinks Dewey’s notion of a situation is, how Russell interpreted Dewey, and where 
Russell went wrong in coming to an understanding of Dewey’s notion of a situation.  In 
this section, I will turn to the criticisms that Russell targeted against Dewey’s account of 
situations.   
 Russell claimed that the roots of Dewey’s notion of a situation stemmed from 
Hegel’s thought.  Hegel’s holism, Russell argued, serves as a strong influence on 
Dewey’s notion of a situation.2  Now, let’s consider Russell’s criticisms of Dewey’s 
notion of a situation.  As Burke notes, Russell’s criticisms of Dewey that he is 
committed to a holism is not a strong argument.3  Russell argues that Dewey’s insistence 
upon continuity and his characterization of situations as “qualified existential wholes” 
commits him to the view that “a ‘situation’ can embrace less than the whole universe.”4  
Russell’s argument, as Burke reads it, proceeds thus: 
According to Dewey, 
                                                          
2  There is currently a debate taking place over the extent to which Dewey was influenced by Hegel.  
Burke argues that Dewey appears to have been influenced by Hegel in his youth.  However, according to 
Burke, Dewey does not appear to have been influenced by Hegel while the debate was taking place 
between Dewey and Russell.  In a passage in which Dewey is defending himself against Russell, Dewey 
appears to admit to Hegel leaving a permanent impact on his thought.  Dewey writes: “Mr. Dewey admits 
not only that he was once an Hegelian but that Hegel left a permanent deposit in his thought...”  John 
Dewey, “Experience, Knowledge, and Value,” 544.   
3  Burke expresses his position as follows: “Russell’s actual argument that it commits Dewey to a some 
sort of holism is both sketchy and brief” (Burke, p. 32).   
4  Russell, “Dewey’s New Logic,” 139-140. 
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I.  Situations are qualified existential wholes (Premise) 
II.  Inquiry is continuous throughout life (Premise)                
Therefore, a situation can embrace no less than the whole universe (Conclusion). 
Burke’s interpretation of Russell’s argument is presented such that Russell argues that 
the conclusion (a situation can embrace no less than the whole universe) necessarily 
follows from the premises.  The remainder of Russell’s arguments consists of arguing 
against the supposed conclusions of Dewey’s views. 
4.2 Burke’s and Dewey’s Responses to Russell’s Interpretation of Dewey’s Account of 
Situations 
Dewey formulated a retort to Russell’s criticisms, and phrased it in the following way: 
Mr. Dewey admits not only that he was once an Hegelian but that Hegel left a 
permanent deposit in his thought; Hegel was a thoroughgoing holist; therefore, Dewey 
uses “situation” in a holistic sense.  I leave it to Mr. Russell as a formal logician to 
decide what he would say to anyone who presented this argument in any other context.  
The following argument answers perhaps more to Mr. Russell’s idea of inductive 
reasoning.  British philosophy is analytic; Dewey not only leans to the Continental 
synthetic tendency but has vigorously criticized British analytic thought; therefore, his 
identification of an experience with a situation commits him to “holism.”5 
 
Dewey’s formulation of Russell’s argument reveals the extent to which Dewey disagreed 
with Russell’s discussion of his arguments.  In this passage, Dewey attempts to provide a 
reconstruction of Russell’s argument.  Russell, as Dewey makes clear in this passage, 
makes a lot of sweeping generalizations about Dewey’s views.  Russell argues from the 
fact that since situations may be a part of the whole universe to the conclusion that all 
situations are a part of the whole universe.  Dewey does not make this claim anywhere 
                                                          
5  Dewey, “Experience, Knowledge, and Value,” 544-545. 
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throughout his writings.  Russell makes a universal generalization (situations are 
concerned with the whole universe) based upon only a possible existential instantiation 
(some situations are concerned with the whole universe).   
 Burke provides the following reconstruction of Russell’s argument: 
(I) A situation is an instance of disequilibrium in the interactions between an organism 
and its environment. 
(II) A situation instigates a process of inquiry, given the organism/environment system’s 
impetus to maintain itself.   
(III) Any action, fact, entity, or event which is relevant as such to the course of this 
inquiry is part of the situation.   
(IV) Any action, fact, entity, event, or process exists or occurs in a single continuum 
with, and hence is relevant as such to the causal history of, any other action, fact, entity, 
event, or process.  From this, according to Russell, it follows that: 
(V) Any action, fact, entity, event, or process in the universe is part of the situation.6 
Premise (I), Burke claims, is Dewey’s definition of a situation.  According to premise 
(II), situations are concerned with inquiry, once an indeterminate situation arises.  There 
is a need to maintain a balance between the organism and its environment.  The next 
premise, (III), is nowhere discussed in Dewey’s writings, but is a plausible premise 
given Dewey’s other views.  Burke argues that Russell interprets premise (IV) from 
Dewey’s insistence upon continuity throughout his writings.  Finally, premise (V) 
supposedly follows from premises one through four.   
                                                          
6  This argument is taken directly from Burke (1994), p. 34. 
  
57
 Burke tries to recover Dewey from Russell’s argument by appealing to the 
boundedness of experience.  He wants to show that situations are bounded by the reach 
and scope of a living creature’s experience.  Dewey discusses situations as follows: “The 
argument here will be that situations are bounded by the reach, scope, or content of a 
living creature’s experience, where the problem in the end is to explain ‘experience as 
situated’, not ‘situations as experienced’.”7  If Burke can show this, then he will provide 
a plausible counter-argument to Russell’s conclusion that “situations are concerned with 
the entire universe.”  Doing this will recover Dewey from Russell’s primary criticisms of 
his views.   
 A place where Dewey discusses what binds a situation is in his “Common Sense 
and Scientific Inquiry” in his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938).  Here, Dewey is 
discussing that the starting point for modern philosophy is to start with a dualism 
between knowledge and the object of knowledge.  Modern philosophy singles an object 
or event out from its environing context and analyzes it as its primary subject-matter.8  It 
focuses on a single object or event in isolation and draws a distinction between the 
knowledge of the object and the environing context.  In the following passage, Dewey 
discusses the dualisms of knowledge that some philosophies take: 
It is only when an object of focal observation is regarded as an object of knowledge in 
isolation that there arises the notion that there are two kinds of knowledge, and two 
kinds of objects of knowledge, so opposed to each other that philosophy must either 
choose which is “real” or find some way of reconciling the respective “realities.”9 
 
                                                          
7  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 37. 
8  Dewey, Logic, 66-67.   
9  Dewey, Logic, 73. 
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 For Dewey, however, it is a mistake to draw such a distinction.  Objects and 
events can only be understood within the environing context of some particular situation.  
If one draws distinctions between knowledge of objects and events and their 
environments, one will neglect to capture the situation as a unique qualitative whole.  
Consider the following passage by Dewey in which he discusses the dualisms drawn 
between objects and events: 
When it is seen that in common sense inquiry there is no attempt made to know the 
object or event as such but only to determine what it signifies with respect to the way 
in which the entire situation should be dealt with, the opposition and conflict do not 
arise.  The object or event in question is perceived as part of the environing world, not 
in and by itself; it is rightly (validly) perceived if and when it acts as clew and guide in 
use-enjoyment.  We live and act in connection with the existing environment, not in 
connection with isolated objects, even though a singular thing may be crucially 
significant in deciding how to respond to total environment.10 
 
 Dewey notes that what makes a situation a whole is an immediately pervading 
quality.  This pervasive quality cannot be understood solely from an emotional, 
mentalistic, or feeling-based standpoint.11  Rather, these have to be understood in 
relation to the complete qualitative situation that is taking place.12  This quality is what 
binds situations together.  It is that quality which comprises the situation and makes it 
the unique qualitative whole that it is.  Consider the following text by Dewey in support 
of this:  “The pervasively qualitative is not only that which binds all constituents into a 
whole but it is also unique; it constitutes in each situation an individual situation, 
indivisible and unduplicable.”13  Any distinctions that take place take place only within 
the situation and not apart from it.  They can only be understood within the unique 
                                                          
10  Dewey, Logic, 73. 
11  Dewey, Logic, 73. 
12  Dewey, Logic, 74. 
13  Dewey, Logic, 74. 
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qualitative situation as a whole.  Dewey discusses distinctions and their relationship to 
situations in the following passage: “Distinctions and relations are instituted within a 
situation; they are recurrent and repeatable in different situations.”14 
 In order to go about showing that situations are not concerned with the entire 
universe (but rather with the pervasive qualitative aspects of each situation), Burke 
proposes to reexamine premises (I) - (V).  Examining these premises will allow for an 
assessment of the position that Russell attributes to Dewey.  If Burke can reveal flaws in 
Russell’s interpretation, then it will allow us to conclude that the premises and 
conclusions that he attributes to Dewey are in fact faulty.  Thus, we could conclude that 
Russell’s position on and characterization of Dewey is untenable.   
 Burke examines Dewey’s concept of continuity in order to undermine an 
incorrect reading of premise (III).  Burke begins with this premise, as this is where 
Russell’s interpretation of Dewey’s concept of continuity comes into play.  It is from 
Dewey’s concept of continuity that Russell draws various conclusions, all of which led 
to the final conclusion, which is impossible to maintain.  Next, he will utilize Dewey’s 
definition of a situation as a disequilibrium in order to argue that his own stance avoids 
the holism/atomism debate rather than being seriously injured by it.   
With respect to premise (IV), this relies upon premise (III), the continuity of 
inquiry.  Burke states that premise (IV) misrepresents the continuity of inquiry in this 
passage: “Premise (IV), as stated, is an attempt to make explicit what Russell only hints 
                                                          
14  Dewey, Logic, 74. 
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at, and it does not adequately express Dewey’s notion of continuity.”15  Consequently, in 
order to undermine Russell’s argument, Burke proposes to examine what ‘continuity of 
inquiry’ means for Dewey.  Burke argues that Dewey’s notion of continuity is so broad 
that it can be confusing.  He mentions, however, that it would be hasty to conclude that 
there is not a single idea that Dewey is striving towards in his work.  There must be a 
beginning and end to Dewey’s continuity of inquiry rather than a never-ending 
continuity.   
 Burke is certainly correct in pointing out that Dewey’s notion of continuity is 
broad, but this in itself does not downplay it enough to characterize it as confusing.  In 
Chapter II of his book, Burke makes significant progress into categorizing the different 
senses in which Dewey uses the term ‘continuity’ and this alone shows that there may be 
some orderliness to Dewey’s usage of this term.  Furthermore, the point that we should 
keep in mind is that we may be searching in the wrong direction if we try to flesh out a 
single characterization of continuity of inquiry in Dewey’s writings without examining 
the different types of continuity first.   
 Perhaps one solution to working out a conception of Dewey’s notion of 
continuity is by trying to differentiate these different types of continuity that Dewey 
distinguishes and trying to develop an account of each one.  For instance, we can begin 
by discussing developmental continuity and formulating an account of this.  Then, we 
                                                          
15  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 37. 
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can develop an account of temporal continuity, for instance, and provide an exegesis of 
this.   
 Burke takes an approach similar to this in his book, but he proposes the 
following: “It would in fact be worthwhile to formulate a concept of continuity which is 
not limited to any one of the special cases so far mentioned but rather is general enough 
to cover all of them.”16  Then, Burke proposes a general principle of Dewey’s notion of 
continuity of inquiry.  This approach is certainly worthwhile and significant, but I think 
instead we should develop an account of each type first and then propose a general 
principle based upon the individual types we develop. 
 If we took this approach, then we would be able to show that Russell’s 
interpretation of Dewey’s concept of continuity has not been adequately analyzed.  
Russell begins with a general concept of continuity and doesn’t analyze this concept 
relative to Dewey’s different types.  Thus, he proposes a general definition that functions 
over and above the individual types that comprise continuity. 
4.3 Douglas Browning’s Considerations of Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to 
Russell 
In a presentation entitled “Some Remarks on Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic,” Browning 
provides a thorough consideration of some of the remarks Burke provides in his book 
Dewey’s New Logic.  A large portion of Browning’s considerations have to deal with 
Burke’s discussion of Dewey’s view of situations.  I will begin by discussing 
                                                          
16  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 40. 
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Browning’s criticisms of Burke’s account of Dewey’s notion of a situation.  I will use 
this understanding of a situation to discuss how Russell interprets Dewey’s arguments, 
and show how (i) Russell’s interpretation is in conflict with how processes take place 
within the world and (ii) is formulated in a way that is not consistent with Dewey’s 
premises (both of which Russell grants). 
 One of Browning’s primary criticisms of Burke’s approach is that his 
characterization derives from his background theory, which he then uses to explain 
concepts in his logic.  This is the mistake of improper importation.  The mistake of 
improper importation occurs when concepts or assumptions which belong to a 
background theory are imported into a logical theory.  These assumptions or concepts 
may be epistemological, metaphysical, or psychological.  Any logical theory must not 
import any assumptions or concepts which belong to a background theory.  The 
logician’s perspective is concerned only with the theoretical consideration of subject-
matter in terms of how the objects or elements considered fit into a logical theory.  Any 
other considerations that may fit into a background theory, such as metaphysical or 
psychological, are not appropriate subject-matter for the logician. 
 The reason Browning characterizes this as a mistake of improper importation has 
to do with the role of situations in Dewey’s work.  First-order inquiries, or those from an 
inquiring agent’s perspective, have to deal with inquiring into situations as they are lived 
and had.  Situations provide the context and subject-matter for those inquiries.  Second-
order inquires, or those from a logician’s perspective, are concerned with inquiry into 
inquiry insofar as these are the ‘facts’ that contribute to identifying and characterizing 
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logical forms.  After a logical theory has been constructed, it is true that one may take a 
detached perspective upon the theory and its applications, but, as Browning states, 
“nothing in this serves to transform one’s understanding of what situations or inquiries 
are by bringing to bear some external picture of how situations arise, how they are 
bounded in a universe of such things as tides, stars, and cars, and why those which are 
indeterminate serve to evoke the course of reflective thinking which we have identified 
as inquiries.”17 
 As I understand Browning’s criticism, Burke does precisely this–he takes a 
reflective stance, the logician’s perspective, on situations as he incorporates them into 
his logical theory.  In other words, he discusses the nature of a situation from a detached 
perspective, and incorporates his discussion into his interpretations of Dewey’s views.  
Burke is turning situations into an object of cognition, meaning that he is speaking of a 
situation as though it is an object to be reflected upon.  Situations always occur in a non-
cognitive context, by which I mean that they are lived and experienced, and never 
rationalized.  By turning situations into an object of cognition, Burke is introducing 
something from a background theory into his logical works.   
 Burke defines a situation, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, in the 
following way: “Situations, occurring in the ongoing activities of some given 
organism/environment system, are instances or episodes (or ‘fields’) of disequilibrium, 
instability, imbalance, disintegration, disturbance, dysfunction, breakdown, etc.”18  He 
                                                          
17  Browning, “Some Remarks on Burke’s Dewey’s New Logic,” 12. 
18  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 22. 
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also says the following with respect to situations: “Such a localized instance of 
disequilibrium is what Dewey means by a situation.”19   
 Contrary to Burke’s claim, Browning argues that Dewey does not discuss a 
situation in such a manner, not even as a part of his background theory.  In other words, 
Browning’s argument is that Dewey did not view situations as consisting of a sense of 
disequilibrium or precariousness.  Instead, this was Dewey’s understanding of an 
indeterminate situation, that is, only one kind of a situation.  Browning notes it is true 
that, for Dewey, determinate situations may contain some indeterminateness, but they 
are not characterized entirely by this.  Burke’s error, Browning argues, is defining a 
‘situation’ in this way, a view which Dewey did not endorse. 
 Dewey introduces the notion of a situation in his Logic.  It is taken as a primitive 
notion, meaning that it does not appeal to any sort of theory.  Dewey provides the 
following discussion of a situation: 
    I begin the discussion by introducing and explaining the denotative force of the 
word situation.  Its import may perhaps be most readily indicated by means of a 
preliminary negative statement.  What is designated by the word “situation” is not a 
single object or event or set of objects and events.  For we never experience or form 
judgments about objects and events in isolation, but only in connection with a 
contextual whole.20 
 
Consider this passage as well: 
every resolved situation which is the terminal state of inquiry exists directly as it is 
experienced.  It is a qualitative individual situation in which are directly incorporated 
and absorbed the results of the mediating processes of inquiry.  As an existential 
situation it is had as the consummation and fulfillment of the operation of 
inquiry....the experienced situation as a qualitative situation is not an object or set of 
objects.  It is just the qualitative situation which it is.  It can be referred to, taken and 
                                                          
19  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 29. 
20  Dewey, Logic, 72. 
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used in subsequent inquiries, and then it presents itself as an object or ordered set of 
objects.  But to treat it as an object involves confusion of two things which are 
experientially different: viz., an object of cognition and a situation that is non-
cognitively had.21 
 
For Dewey, situations are undergone from an experiential standpoint.  They can only be 
understood in terms of how they are felt as a qualitative whole.  Situations cannot be 
removed from the context of the situation and be made into an object of cognition.   
4.4 An Evaluation of Russell’s Dewey Based on Browning’s Dewey 
 Now that we (Browning and myself) have criticized Burke’s view of Dewey on 
situations, how does this affect his refutation of Russell?  If Burke is wrong about 
Dewey, then is Russell free from problems?  I will show that Browning’s understanding 
of situations reveals many errors in Russell’s criticisms of Dewey that Burke’s 
interpretation does not quite capture.  I will presuppose the reading of a situation 
provided by Browning and myself.  I think that Russell’s argument is not a strong 
argument, for acceptance of it leads to conflicting states of affairs with how things take 
place in the world.  I will argue that there is faulty reasoning in Russell’s interpretation 
of Dewey.  Finally, I will present another argument, which presupposes this same 
reading of a situation for Dewey, which shows that Russell attempts to define a situation.  
Situations, for Dewey, cannot be defined. 
 Let’s suppose that it is true that the conclusion – a situation can embrace no less 
than the whole universe – does follow from the above premises – (i) situations are 
qualified existential wholes and (ii) inquiry is continuous throughout life.  According to 
Dewey, every situation has its unique qualitative aspect.  It is unlike any other situation, 
                                                          
21  Dewey, Logic, 525-526. 
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and cannot be compared or related to another.  According to premise (i), every situation 
is unique (situations are qualified existential wholes).  Thus, when my car breaks down 
and can’t run, it is a different situation than when my neighbor’s car breaks down and 
can’t run.  My car has factors that caused it to break down, which are factors 
independent of what is taking place in my neighbor’s car.  Similarly, my neighbor’s car 
has unique aspects that caused it to break down, which operate independently of the 
functioning of my car, because, presumably, the two cars are different cars.  There are 
situational factors that depend upon the context.   
 Russell argues in premise (ii) that inquiry is continuous throughout life, by which 
he means there is continuity between all objects and events that have a bearing upon 
each situation.  In other words, every situation is effected by all other surrounding 
objects and events.  Since inquiry is continuous throughout, meaning that all objects and 
events interact with one another, Russell argues that situations are concerned with 
everything in the entire universe.  This conclusion supposedly follows from the 
interconnectedness of all objects and events in relation to each situation.   
 Let’s go back to my original example and consider how this argument holds up.  
When I am driving my car and it breaks down, there are many factors that contribute to 
this, including (possibly) the coolant level, the amount of oil in the car, and the 
functioning of the motor. All of these factors are important in relation to the functioning 
of my car.  If inquiry is continuous throughout life, then it follows that such things as the 
temperature of the ocean on a given day has any effect on the functioning of my car.  
The temperature of the ocean on a given day is important in relation to such things as the 
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possibility of a fisherman catching a fish, the likelihood of seeing people swimming in it, 
and the population of fish.   
 While my car may be effected by the temperature of the air outside and (perhaps) 
even the temperature of the ocean, which could be over hundreds of miles (close to 
thousands) from my current location, I find it hard to believe that the temperature of the 
ocean on a given day has any effect on the oil level of my car, the coolant level, or the 
functioning of the motor.  According to Russell, everything would effect the functioning 
of my car, including the boy running in the yard next door, the amount of chemical 
research being produced in a single laboratory during a given day, and so forth.  This 
follows since Russell claims that all objects and events are interrelated and effect each 
situation.   
The question that needs to be considered here in relation to Russell’s argument 
is, does the relation effect the functioning of my car in any significant way? Two points 
to consider in raising this question are the following:  (i) we do not have the instruments 
that could measure this impact that Russell is claiming situations have and (ii) if we 
could, it wouldn’t make any difference.  In considering the first point, the impact that 
Russell is claiming that inquiry has, namely, all objects and events are effected by any 
given situation is not something that could ever conceivably be determined.  In short, 
there is no method or instrument that could measure the accuracy of such a claim.  The 
second point is simply that it wouldn’t make any difference if we could measure such a 
claim, for most effects from one situation would not make any significant practical 
difference on other situations taking place.  Russell’s point is a theoretical point about 
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inquiry, and it neglects to consider the fact that, even if his point is accurate, it would not 
make any difference in how we experience these effects or how we perceive them. 
 Having considered this question, a boy running through the yard, the amount of 
chemical research being produced in a laboratory during a given day, and the 
temperature of the ocean do not seem to have any bearing on the amount of oil in my car 
(which could cause it to breakdown).  Thus, Russell’s premises lead to conclusions that 
are in conflict with the way the world actually is.  For instance, Russell’s premises lead 
to the conclusion that a boy running through a yard on a given day would effect the 
functioning of my car.   
 However, the activities a boy is performing on a yard during a given day would 
seem to function quite independently of my car and thus have no effect on its 
functioning.  Since the argument that I’ve presented is the one that Russell thinks Dewey 
holds, then does that mean that Dewey is wrong?  In other words, will I be revealing a 
flaw in Dewey’s reasoning by showing that Russell’s interpretation of Dewey is in 
conflict with how things occur in the actual world?  My reply is that I won’t.  I’ve 
attempted to show that Russell’s interpretation of Dewey leads to consequences that are 
in conflict with things in the actual world.  Consequently, by showing that Russell’s 
argument has conflicting aspects, I will be showing that Russell’s interpretation is faulty, 
not Dewey’s actual views.   
 Furthermore, I would like to criticize Russell’s argument on the grounds that his 
conclusion (a situation can embrace no less than the whole universe) is based on false 
assumptions about Dewey’s view.  Situations are unique.  There are no universal traits 
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across situations; they all have their own distinct, incomparable, qualitative and 
situational factors that contribute to making it the situation that it is.  Although certain 
situations may have things in common with others, there are no universal traits that 
define a situation.   
 Situations cannot be defined.  They cannot be given a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that serve to set limits on them.  This is the very premise that 
Russell concedes constitutes a situation for Dewey (premise I in his argument).  If this is 
true, then his conclusion could not coalesce with this premise.  His conclusion would put 
a universal quantification on a situation, namely, that every situation must be concerned 
with the entire universe, meaning that all situations are affected by all other objects and 
events.   
 This, however, is not consistent with premise (I), which he grants as Dewey’s 
premise.  According to this premise, situations have to have certain traits that are 
universal (they are concerned with all objects and events); however, situations, by 
Dewey’s very discussion of them, are unique.  They differ in fundamental ways from 
every other situation, and they cannot be captured by a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions that serve to define them.  However, this is what Russell is doing by arguing 
for this conclusion; he is defining situations by requiring that they be concerned with all 
objects and events.  Russell fails to understand that situations for Dewey can only be 
understood as contextual wholes. 
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CHAPTER V 
DETERS ON DEWEY 
 Dewey’s logical theory has many unique aspects.  His logic grew in opposition to 
many of the prominent logics that were influential during his day.  This is a result of the 
fact that the prominent logics were an extension of the Aristotelian theory.  Dewey was 
strongly opposed to the Aristotelian claim that there can be change in the subject-matter 
of logic without change in the logical forms.  This was a common assumption in many of 
the theories of Dewey’s time-period.  He presents a contrary view to the Aristotelian 
picture.  Contrary to the view that logical forms do not change when there is a change in 
the subject-matter of logic, Dewey proposes, “The more adequate that logic was in its 
own day, the less fitted is it to form the framework of present logical theory.”1 Under 
Dewey’s account, logical forms can change with the change in subject-matter.  Since the 
objects of inquiry since Aristotle’s time have changed, the logical forms that arise from 
the subject-matter will change.  This follows from his view that logical forms can change 
with a change in the subject-matter. 
 Dewey, as a consequence, introduced a new theory that differed from the 
Aristotelian doctrine.  For Dewey, logic was a theory of inquiry.  Rather than basing 
logic on the subject-predicate analysis of linguistic statements, Dewey argued that it was 
concerned with everyday subject-matter and this material could not be translated into a 
symbolic language.  Furthermore, certain notions in Dewey’s theory, including 
                                                          
1  Dewey, Logic, 82. 
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warranted assertibility, propositions, and judgments, are different from or non-existent in 
other logical theories.    
 In this chapter, I will present a general overview of Dewey’s logical theory based 
on the conclusions that I have drawn in previous chapters.  My intention will be to 
emphasize the contextual and situational factors in Dewey’s theory of inquiry, and, most 
importantly, present it as an account that emphasizes the way inquiry is influenced by 
each organism’s cultural and experiential backgrounds.  Emphasizing it in this way will 
reveal the extent to which organisms experience the world in their own unique ways, and 
how organisms are seriously influenced by not only biology but other factors as well.   
5.1 Evolution in Dewey 
Dewey devoted considerable space to discussing biological and evolutionary matters.  
He was interested in evolution not only because he thought it would impact future 
sciences but also since it was developed in opposition to the traditional ancient Greek 
picture.  The ancient Greek account regarded nature as being concerned with finality.  
Change and origin were treated as signs of defects.   
 Darwin’s publication of the “Origin of Species” presented a philosophy of nature 
that challenged the traditional view.  The Darwinian account states that there is no causal 
preordained force that can create nature, plants and animals, and the human species.  His 
account regarded all organic adaptations as a result of constant variation.  All variations 
that are harmful in the struggle for existence are eliminated.   
 Darwin’s book, Dewey writes, caused an outcry from the theological side.  The 
real issues at stake with Darwin’s publication were veiled by this theological clamor.  
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Anti-Darwinians presented the picture that the debate was between science, on the one 
hand, and religion, on the other.  Darwin realized that the primary issue lay within 
science itself.  Fearing the label of “crazy” by his scientific peers, Darwin hesitated to 
publish his book for two decades. 
 Dewey identifies two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking.  First, an 
attempt is being made to coalesce our traditional philosophical outlooks with the 
Darwinian picture of nature.  Secondly, there is an emergence of a type of philosophical 
outlook, distinct from science, which opens up a reality that science can never access.  It 
examines how things are experienced.  The introduction of this new philosophical 
outlook has resulted in an outcry from many philosophies and religions. 
 In his The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Dewey does not take a committed 
stance on Darwin’s theory of evolution.  Even though he explores evolution from a 
historical perspective, Dewey never states how evolution relates to his entire philosophy 
or theory of inquiry.  Despite the fact that Dewey does not take a committal position 
with respect to evolution, the view that most characterizes his position is that he 
regarded evolution as a science that has challenged many traditional perspectives on 
nature.  Furthermore, he regards it as a science that may have an impact on future 
developments in science and philosophies of nature.   
5.2 The Subject-Matter of Logic 
Dewey draws a distinction between the ultimate subject-matter of logic and its 
proximate subject-matter.  The latter is concerned with the relations that hold between 
propositions, such as affirmation-negation, particular-general, etc.  The proximate 
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subject-matter of logic deals with the words, is, is-not, if-then, only, and so forth.  It is 
concerned with, in part, statements and their logical connectives.   
 The ultimate subject-matter of logic deals with such questions as, do logical 
forms have independent existence apart from any subject-matter?  Do logical forms only 
arise from everyday subject-matter?  When it comes to questions concerning the 
proximate subject-matter of logic, there is some confidence in the answers, but nothing 
is complete.  However, questions regarding the ultimate subject-matter of logic are filled 
with controversy.   
 The position that Dewey develops in his Logic is that logical forms arise within 
the process of inquiry, and are directed towards the control of inquiry in order to 
establish a warrantably assertible judgment.2  This conception not only implies that 
logical forms are recognized and understood during the process of inquiry, but also that 
logical forms emerge from the operations that are taking place in inquiry.3  Thus, for 
Dewey, logical forms do not have a necessary, antecedent existence apart from any 
particular context.  Logical forms exist in relation to some particular subject-matter from 
which they arise.    
5.3 Dewey on Situations and the Postulate of Immediate Empiricism 
Situations play an important part in the process of inquiry.  A situation, for Dewey, is not 
something that can be singled out as an object or event.  It can only be experienced as a 
                                                          
2  Dewey, Logic, 10. 
3  Dewey, Logic, 11. 
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contextual whole, meaning that it cannot be singled out of its environing context.  
Situations can only be experienced as they are had in an experiential situation. 
 A situation is experienced as an immediately pervading whole.  They are only 
experienced as they are felt.  By saying that situations are felt, it does not mean to 
indicate that they are single events that can be taken out of their environing context.  
Furthermore, by stating that it is felt, it is not meant to indicate that it is a feeling, 
emotion, or mental state.  Rather, feelings, emotions, and mental states are described 
within the contextual situation as a whole.  Furthermore, this quality that pervades 
situations is that which binds situations into a whole, meaning that it composes all of the 
elements taking place within the situation into a unity.  In addition, situations are not 
replicable.  Each situation can only be understood as the unique qualitative situation that 
it is, and cannot be compared or reduplicated.  Discourse is sensible only with reference 
to a situation, and cannot be understood outside of one.  
 In discussing situations, Dewey is careful to distinguish the different types of 
situations that take place during the process of inquiry.  These situations, for Dewey, 
include the indeterminate situation, problematic situation, and determinate situation.  
These are all different phases of the process of inquiry, and need to be sharply 
distinguished.   
 Dewey notes that inquiry and questioning are nearly synonymous in meaning, 
given their relatedness.  He relates inquiry to questioning by stating that when we inquire 
into something, we are in the process of questioning it.  The indeterminate situation is 
what is taking place when this questioning occurs.  The doubt that comes with 
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questioning is what characterizes the indeterminate situation.  Indeterminate situations 
are characterized by doubt, confusion, and uncertainty.  The doubtfulness that occurs in 
each situation is not the same, universal doubt that pervades all situations.  Rather, the 
doubt that takes place is unique to the individual situation.  
 The situation as a whole has the traits of doubt, confusion, and uncertainty.  The 
doubt that arises is a feature of the situation.  Dewey refers to personal doubts taking 
place within an inquirer’s mind that are not originated from and relative to an existential 
situation as ‘pathological’.  Situations cannot be restored by restoring personal states of 
mind.  By stating this, Dewey is conveying the idea that the inquirer’s mind that is 
undergoing the situation is not the source of the doubtfulness that pervades the 
indeterminate situation.   
 Rather, it is the very situation that comprises the doubtfulness and confusion 
taking place.  Thus, trying to restore an indeterminate situation (one pervaded with doubt 
and uncertainty) into a determinate one (a state of equilibrium) by trying to resolve the 
inquirer’s personal mind is an error and the situation can, however, only be resolved by 
restoring conditions of the underlying existential situation.  Dewey expresses this in 
Chapter VI of his Logic as follows: 
The habit of disposing of the doubtful as if it belonged only to us rather than to the 
existential situation in which we are caught and implicated is an inheritance from 
subjectivistic psychology.  The biological antecedent conditions of an unsettled 
situation are involved in that state of imbalance in organic-environmental interactions 
which has already been described.  Restoration of integration can be effected, in one 
case as in the other, only by operations which actually modify existing conditions, not 
by merely “mental” processes.4 
 
                                                          
4  Dewey, Logic, 110. 
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 Dewey notes that an indeterminate situation may have been called a problematic 
situation, but he is clear to draw a sharp distinction between the two.  The indeterminate 
situation transforms into a problematic situation when the process of inquiry is applied to 
it.  These types of situations are not cognitive in nature.  The situation as a whole is 
precognitive.  For inquiry into something to take place, the situation must be determined 
to be problematic in nature.  Determining that a situation is problematic does not in itself 
constitute the transformation of the situation into a determinate, or resolved, one.  It does 
not carry inquiry much further.   
 Rather, it is only the first step in the process of working towards resolving the 
situation.  By stating that it is a problematic situation, Dewey is not stating that it is 
similar to a mathematical problem in school.  Dewey means that it is a step in the 
process of transforming the indeterminate situation into a determinate one.  When a 
problematic situation is judged incorrectly, inquiry into the situation goes astray.    
 In stating that a given situation is problematic, it means nothing unless the 
problem has a possible solution.  No problem that is recognized as completely 
indeterminate can be transformed into a determinate situation.  The first step in resolving 
the situation is to recognize the various constituents of the situation which are settled.5  
These constituents have to be observed.  Taken collectively, these observed constituents 
together constitute “the facts of the situation.”6  These various facts are what compose 
the problem, and are the constituents of the situation which must be taken into account in 
order for resolution of the problem to take place.   
                                                          
5  Dewey, Logic, 112. 
6  Dewey, Logic, 113. 
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 By observing the factual conditions in the situation, a possible solution can be 
formulated based upon these.  The possible solution to the problem presents itself as an 
idea.  The idea is the expected consequences of what will take place if a series of 
operations are performed on the indeterminate situation.  The facts of the case have to be 
subjected to observation.  The more often the facts are submitted to observation, the 
more likely that a solution to the situation that has arisen will be conceived and 
instituted.   
 Another important aspect of Dewey’s philosophy related to situations is his 
postulate of immediate empiricism.  According to this postulate, things are what they are 
experienced as.  In order to describe something, one must begin by examining how it is 
experienced.  The example Dewey gives to illustrate this is a horse.  If it is a horse that is 
to be described, then the person who is describing it, whether it is the statesman, the 
horse trader, or the family man, will explain how the horse is experienced for them.  
Even if the descriptions given by each person differ in fundamental respects, the 
descriptions will, nevertheless, be equally as plausible and accurate.   
 The postulate of immediate empiricism states that we should take as our starting-
point things as they are experienced.  Thus, reality could not be known solely from the 
perspective of an all-competent all-knower.  Knowing is only one mode of experience.  
The primary philosophic task, from the standpoint of the postulate of immediate 
empiricism, is to find out how knowledge is experienced.7  Making the assumption that 
things are what they are known to be from the standpoint of someone with knowledge is 
                                                          
7  Dewey, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” 228-229. 
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an erroneous assumption.  Such an assumption leaves out an account of how the 
knowledge standpoint is experienced.   
5.4 The Foundations of Inquiry: Biological and Cultural 
In order to fully understand Dewey’s theory of inquiry, it is necessary to provide a 
discussion of its foundations.  Dewey identifies two different foundations that guide 
inquiry: the biological and the cultural.  Both are necessary conditions for the existence 
of inquiry.  They are not distinct aspects that have no interaction between each other.  
There is a connection between them.  The problems that human beings encounter grow 
out of their interactions with one another, and can only be resolved into determinate 
situations by means of their biological organs, such as eyes and ears.   
 The biological plays a part insofar as biological organs serve to guide humans in 
resolving indeterminate situations into determinate ones.  Without these organs, inquiry 
could not be guided or operated.  These organs, Dewey argues, prepare the way for 
inquiry to take place, as Dewey expresses in this passage: “The purpose of the following 
discussion is to show that biological functions and structures prepare the way for 
deliberate inquiry and how they foreshadow its pattern.”8 
 In his account of the biological foundations of inquiry, Dewey introduces the 
postulate of continuity.  According to this postulate, there cannot be reduction of 
“higher” species to that of “lower.” As I understand Dewey, different types of species of 
animals cannot be reduced to each other.  Dewey is not, then, proposing an evolutionary 
theory.  Rather, continuity refers to something akin to the growth and development of an 
                                                          
8  Dewey, Logic, 30. 
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organism from seed to maturity.  There is continuity in each organism’s life from seed to 
maturity.  This is expressed by Dewey in the following way: “The primary postulate of a 
naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more 
complex) activities and forms.”9  By writing this, Dewey is arguing that the activities 
and forms in each organism’s life exhibit continuity.  There is not a break from one stage 
of an organism’s life to that of another stage.   
 Furthermore, for Dewey the organism and the environment play an important 
role in the biological foundations of his logic.  There is an integration between the 
organism and its environment.  The organism is dependent upon its environment for its 
existence.  Not only does the organism perform activities that assist it in survival, such 
as breathing and eating, but the environment assists as well, by providing food and 
shelter for the organism.  Given that there is interaction between the organism and its 
environment, there is need to maintain a balance between the two.  There is an internal 
mechanism that serves to keep the balance and harmony between the two maintained.   
 Not only are the foundations of inquiry biological, but they are also social.  In 
addition to having biological features, humans also have languages and shared 
communities.  These various activities contribute to making humans the social creatures 
they are.  The cultural environment is so intricately interwoven with the physical 
environment that our interactions with it, the problems that arise from it, and our 
solutions to these problems are deeply influenced by our cultural environments.   
                                                          
9  Dewey, Logic, 30. 
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 Aristotle remarked with respect to human beings that they are social animals.  
Because of this nature, humans enter situations which have no bearing on the biological.  
In other words, the social and cultural aspects of human beings introduce them to 
situations that are not significantly related to the biological level.  By describing humans 
this way, Dewey is expressing his view that cultural conditions can affect humans 
without the biological also affecting them in the same situation.  As a result, cultural 
conditions are somewhat independent of organic biological conditions, and, thus, they 
operate in different ways of functioning.   
 Humans are more social in nature than other animals, such as a bee or an ant, 
since humans are in an environment that is culturally transmitted.  Dewey writes that 
even the neuro-muscular structures of human beings are influenced by cultural heredity.  
Most activities performed by humans, including reading, writing, and speaking, are 
influenced by our cultural environment.  Without the cultural environment, a large 
majority of humans’ activities could not be performed.  Dewey expresses his views 
about the cultural and biological aspects of humans in his Logic: 
    Man, as Aristotle remarked, is a social animal.  This fact introduces him into 
situations and originates problems and ways of solving them that have no precedent 
upon the organic biological level.  For man is social in another sense than the bee and 
ant, since his activities are encompassed in an environment that is culturally 
transmitted, so that what man does and how he acts, is determined not by organic 
structure and physical heredity alone but by the influence of cultural heredity, 
embedded in traditions, institutions, customs and the purposes and beliefs they both 
carry and inspire.  Even the neuro-muscular structures of individuals are modified 
through the influence of the cultural environment upon the activities performed.  The 
acquisition and understanding of language with proficiency in the arts (that are foreign 
to other animals than men) represent an incorporation within the physical structure of 
human beings of the effects of cultural conditions, an interpenetration so profound that 
resulting activities are as direct and seemingly “natural” as are the first reactions of an 
infant.  To speak, to read, to exercise any art, industrial, fine or political, are instances 
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of modifications wrought within the biological organism by the cultural 
environment.10 
 
5.5 Propositions, Judgments, and Warranted Assertibility 
There are many factors that take place during the process of inquiry that led to the 
establishment of a warrantably assertible judgment.  Included in the process are 
propositions.  Propositions for Dewey are not concerned with the formal truth or falsity 
of a given statement or utterance.  Rather, propositions serve an intermediate role in the 
process of inquiry, in which they contribute to bringing forth a warrantably assertible 
judgment.   
Propositions are carried through by means of symbols, and have no existential 
import.  Furthermore, for Dewey, propositions only make sense within some particular 
subject-matter.  They cannot be understood outside of some context of inquiry.  The 
reason for this follows from the fact that propositions serve a role only in the context of 
inquiry, and do not have an antecedent, necessary existence apart from some subject-
matter.  Thus, propositions can only be understood within a particular context.   
 Judgments are concerned with the transformation of an indeterminate situation 
into a settled, determinate situation.  Furthermore, judgments are individual in nature, 
meaning that they are unique in their own fundamental, qualitative natures.  Every 
judgment, then, will differ from every other judgment, since each qualitative situation 
will be different from every other qualitative situation. 
 A judgment is about a given concrete situation.  Consequently, judgments are 
singular in nature, insofar as they are concerned with an “individual” situation.  Even 
                                                          
10  Dewey, Logic, 49. 
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though they are “individual” in nature, they are also universal.  Given that a judgment is 
concerned with a particular situation, the goal of a judgment is to resolve any situation 
correctly so that the same problematic situation does not recur.  In this sense, then, a 
judgment is universal insofar as it is concerned with a “once-and-for-all” judgment, 
stating that a situation requires a certain course of action to resolve it.11  It is a judgment 
that is meant to satisfy the inquiry once and for all, so that the need to resolve the 
situation again never arises.  Furthermore, the universal proposition established for some 
particular situation is intended to be a recourse for action should a similar situation arise 
again.  The same universal proposition can be used as a way of resolving it. 
 Warranted assertibility plays a fundamental role in the outcome of inquiry.  
However, it is not to be substituted for, nor is it, an account of truth.  In other words, it is 
not concerned with truth or falsity.  Rather, warranted assertibility is concerned with 
formulating the conditions that justify a final judgment through the process of inquiry.  
Propositions are not concerned with the actual state of believing.  Rather, they play an 
intermediate role in the process of the establishment of a warrantably assertible 
judgment.  Propositions, under this account, are not concerned with formal truth-falsity.  
Judgments that result from the process of inquiry can be concerned with being true or 
false, but not the actual process of inquiry.  Warranted assertibility is what results as the 
product of a successful inquiry.  
 
 
                                                          
11  This differs from universal propositions, however, insofar as the latter are concerned with universal 
characteristics of kinds, independent of any particular situation, while judgments are universal in the sense 
that they are concerned with making a judgment that remains, it is “once-and-for-all.”  
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5.6 Inquiry and Instrumentalism 
In this section, I will turn to a discussion of Dewey’s account of inquiry and his 
instrumentalism.  He discusses his account of inquiry in several of his books, but I will 
rely on the one he develops in his Logic.  In addition, I will discuss why he gives the 
name ‘instrumentalism’ to his account of logic, and just what accepting instrumentalism 
entails.  I will rely on the instrumentalism that he develops in his Essays in Experimental 
Logic. 
 For Dewey, inquiry consists of the transformation of an indeterminate situation 
into one that is a determinate whole.  When a problematic situation occurs that needs to 
be resolved, the process of inquiry is instituted to resolve this problematic situation into 
a determinate one.  Performing this process consists of using observation and applying 
habits on the environment.  The original indeterminate situation is “open” to the process 
of inquiry, meaning that there is a situation taking place that needs to be resolved and it 
is possible to institute inquiry on the particular situation.   
In addition, the constituents that comprise the situation to make it the 
indeterminate situation it is are scattered.  Instituting the process of inquiry, which 
involves employing operations on the environment, will attempt to restore these 
scattered constituents into a unified whole.  This resulting situation is a determinate 
situation.  The latter is one which is not only closed off, meaning that the constituents 
are not open for inquiry to take place, but also is finished.12  Through the process of 
                                                          
12  Dewey, Logic, 109. 
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transforming the indeterminate situation, propositions are employed intermediately in 
the process as means of bringing forth a warrantably assertible judgment.   
 The name Dewey gave his theory of inquiry is instrumentalism.  Instrumentalism 
states that thinking is instrumental in terms of transforming the environment from an 
indeterminate situation into a determinate one.  Thinking has control over the 
environment insofar as it can manipulate and alter its subject-matter to change the 
physical constitution of the environment.  Instrumentalism holds that something known 
(a knowledge-object) can never be singled out as a single object or solitary unit.  Rather, 
knowledge of something is surrounded by many other contextual factors occurring 
within the surrounding environment.  These surrounding contextual factors prevent the 
possibility of singling knowledge out as solitary objects.   
The distinctive trait of instrumentalism is that it defines thought by work done 
and consequences effected.13  Thought, or intelligence, is the name for the events and 
acts that make up the process of inspection for future operations performed.14  The 
events and actions that comprise this process are real in the sense that they are just as 
natural as anything encountered in ordinary experience.  The process of thinking is 
something actually existing organisms perform.  However, thought does not define their 
essence.  Actually existing objects are defined through the efficacies of their actions, or 
the ends they produce.15 
 
                                                          
13  John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 30. 
14  Dewey, Experimental in Logic, 31. 
15  Dewey, Experimental in Logic, 31. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 Having shown various commentators’ interpretations of Dewey, I now wish to 
diagnose where each has gone wrong in arriving at an understanding of Dewey’s theory 
of inquiry.  I will illustrate each commentator’s (Burke and Russell) misinterpretations 
on a case-by-case basis.  If I can show that each commentator has failed to understand 
some aspect of Dewey’s theory of inquiry, then I will have accomplished my 
overarching project of showing that where commentators have gone wrong in arriving at 
their development of Dewey’s views is that they have each failed to understand various 
aspects of his theory of inquiry.  The misinterpretations by Burke and Russell are 
fundamental and problematic mistakes.  By examining where they have gone wrong, I 
trust to add new material to the debates taking place.   
 In arriving at an understanding of Dewey’s account of propositions and 
warranted assertibility, Russell misunderstands two important points of Dewey.  First, 
Russell inserts his own theory of truth into his reading of Dewey.  Russell believed in the 
objective truth or falsity of propositions, and he read this theory into Dewey’s works.  
Secondly, Russell mistakes Dewey’s discussion of warranted assertiblity as a 
substitution for truth.  Dewey, however, did not make such a substitution, and, in fact, 
devoted an article to discussing the fact that he does not substitute warranted assertibility 
for truth. 
 As illustrated in Chapter II, Russell’s account of propositions regarded them as 
being either true or false.  In other words, there is an objective fact about the matter.  
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Russell discusses this position in his book chapter “John Dewey” of his A History of 
Western Philosophy.  He begins by arguing that declarative sentences have truth values.  
The sentence he considers is “Columbus crossed the ocean in 1492,” which is a true 
statement.  As a result, “Columbus crossed the ocean in 1776" is a false statement. 
 Sentences are given their truth values according to their significance in the 
language being used.  Significance, not the words in the sentences, determine the truth or 
falsity of a given sentence.1  When a sentence is uttered, it expresses a belief, which is 
something that can be translated into a different language.2  The belief that is expressed 
is what is true or false, depending on whether or not the belief has a relation to an 
objective fact in the world.  Beliefs take place within an organism, but they are classified 
as true or false in how well they correspond to empirically, objective observed facts 
outside the organism.  Consider Russell’s expression of this:  
Such illustrations suggest objectivity in truth and falsehood: what is true (or false) is a 
state of the organism, but it is true (or false), in general, in virtue of occurrences 
outside the organism.  Sometimes experimental tests are possible to determine truth 
and falsehood, but sometimes they are not; when they are not, the alternative 
nevertheless remains, and is significant.3 
 
 In examining the role of warranted assertibility in Dewey’s logical writings, 
Russell discusses his own account of beliefs as being concerned with truth or falsity.  He 
states that the notion of beliefs in general is an undeniable fact – they do take place.  
Given that there are beliefs, the important question that this gives rise to is, Can these be 
divided into two classes, those that are true and those that are false?  If these beliefs as a 
whole cannot be divided into one of these two classes, can the constituents that compose 
                                                          
1  Russell, “John Dewey,” 821. 
2  Russell, “John Dewey,” 821. 
3  Russell, “John Dewey,” 822. 
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the beliefs?  Russell then asks, if one of these can be answered in the affirmative, is it 
because the belief is true insofar as it has successful or failing effects, or because there is 
an objective relation that holds between the belief and a fact in the world?   
 Russell claims that he is prepared to accept that beliefs as a whole may not be 
true or false – their constituents may have different truth values, some true, some false.  
Given that some beliefs are vague, they may fail to be true or false.  Russell, however, 
will not grant any further claims about the truth or falsity of propositions.  Thus, from 
the start, Russell will not begin to consider Dewey’s account of warranted assertibility, 
which Russell seems to take as Dewey’s account of truth.  Instead, Russell begins by 
evaluating Dewey’s account of warranted assertibility against the conditions that 
formulate his own account of truth.  This is evidenced by Russell in the following 
passage:  
    I am prepared to admit that a belief as a whole may fail to be “true” or “false” 
because it is compounded of several, some true, and some false.  I am also prepared to 
admit that some beliefs fail, through vagueness, to be either true or false, though 
others, in spite of vagueness, are either true or false.  Further than this I cannot go 
towards agreement with Dr. Dewey.4 
 
 In reading his own account of truth into Dewey, Russell overlooks the point that 
truth does not play any role in Dewey’s theory of inquiry.  As I illustrated in Chapter II, 
propositions are neither true nor false, and neither are warrantably assertible judgments.  
Truth and falsity are not features of Dewey’s theory of inquiry.  Russell makes the 
mistake of assuming that, for Dewey, (I) propositions are either true or false and (II) 
warranted assertibility is a substitution for truth.  Thus, in coming to understand 
                                                          
4 Russell, “Warranted Assertibility,” 405.   
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Dewey’s theory of inquiry, Russell neglects to realize that truth and falsity are not 
features of propositions. 
 In Chapter III, I considered Burke’s interpretation of the role of situations in 
Dewey’s account of logic.  Whereas Burke places significant emphasis on the role of 
evolution in Dewey’s theory of inquiry, several of Dewey’s writings indicate that 
evolution, if it plays any role at all, does not play as much of a role as Burke maintains.  
Although Burke provides an insightful and informative interpretation of Dewey, he does 
not place enough emphasis on the extent to which Dewey’s philosophy as a whole is 
social in nature and the extent to which the postulate of immediate empiricism plays a 
pivotal role.  Thus, Burke has failed to grasp the foundations of Dewey’s account of 
inquiry and the starting point from which all inquiry aims. 
 In Chapter II of his book Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell, Burke 
discusses his interpretation of Dewey’s account of situations.  Burke characterizes 
Dewey’s account of situations as an instance of breakdown, dysfunction, or imbalance in 
an “organism/environment system.”5  Burke expresses this as follows: “Situations, 
occurring in the ongoing activities of some given organism/environment system, are 
instances or episodes (or “fields”) of disequilibrium, instability, imbalance, 
disintegration, disturbance, dysfunction, breakdown, etc.”6   
 Then, Burke attributes these characteristics of situations to any 
organism/environment system along the evolutionary chain.  Burke continues: “No 
single term covers everything we would want to mention here, due to the generality of 
                                                          
5  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 22. 
6  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 22. 
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the terms ‘situation’ and ‘inquiry’.  These terms should apply to a wide range of 
organism/environment systems at virtually any level of evolutionary complexity.”7  
Thus, in writing this, Burke takes situations for Dewey as concerned with evolutionary 
features.  Furthermore, Burke characterizes inquiry in general as concerned with 
evolution, for he writes: “Inquiry, in a common mentalistic sense of the term, should be 
viewed as an evolutionary variation on what originally appears as an innate impulse of 
organism/environment systems to transform situations so as to counteract such 
instabilities.”8   
 During his discussion of situations, Burke does not provide an examination of the 
social features of inquiry or the experiential aspects of the organism’s encounters.  
Rather, Burke discusses situations and inquiry as though they can only be understood 
within the context of a purely physical science.  However, Dewey’s theory of the process 
of inquiry states that the physical sciences can only be understood in relation to the 
social matrices and relations taking place.   
 Throughout Dewey’s writings, the emphasis on the social aspects of inquiry and 
life is present.  In his book chapter “Social Inquiry” of his Logic, Dewey discusses the 
fact that social problems are existential in their content.9  In other words, social problems 
make direct reference to the everyday experiences that are undergone in an organism’s 
life.  As a consequence of this, Dewey writes that social problems are naturalistic, and, 
consequently, a branch of the natural sciences.  Furthermore, inquiries undergone by the 
physical sciences all proceed within the confines of social matrices.  These matrices can 
                                                          
7  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 22. 
8  Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 22. 
9  Dewey, Logic, 481. 
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only be understood within the social relations that take place between organisms.  
Consider how Dewey expresses this: “All inquiry proceeds within a cultural matrix 
which is ultimately determined by the nature of social relations.  The subject-matter of 
physical inquiry at any time falls within a larger social field.”10  Thus, the examinations 
undergone by the physical sciences can only be understood with reference to the cultures 
and social conditions taking place during a particular time-period.   
 Any theory that attempts to reduce human behavior to physical causes can only 
be understood within the context of the social matrices and relations that hold during the 
time in which the inquiry is occurring.  If evolution is understood as a physical science 
that attempts to explain phenomena (human origins), then it is subject to being 
understood not only as a theory about human development but also as a theory that is the 
product of the social relations and intelligence taking place during the time-period in 
which it is being studied.  Thus, if evolution does play a role in Dewey’s theory of 
inquiry, it cannot be understood within this framework alone, and it cannot be 
understood entirely as a physical theory.   
 In addition, in discussing the importance of biology (the physical foundations of 
inquiry), Burke does not make any reference to the importance of the experiential 
aspects of situations.  Dewey’s postulate of immediate empiricism stipulates that we 
should take our experiences as our starting point for how we undergo and understand the 
world.  Thus, physical phenomena are not experienced as physical phenomena, but are 
experienced as the phenomenal features that accompany the presentation of the physical 
                                                          
10  Dewey, Logic, 481. 
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phenomena.  They are understood through the medium of an organism’s phenomenal 
experience of the object.  Every person will have different accounts of how a given 
object is experienced, and each person’s account of the object may differ.   
 Finally, in Chapter IV, I reveal the plausibility of Browning’s interpretation of 
Burke’s account of situations.  Browning examines Burke’s account of situations and 
reveals that it is not in accordance with Dewey’s actual writings.  Dewey discusses 
situations from a contextual standpoint, while Burke fails to grasp this.  Burke fails to 
distinguish between indeterminate situations, problematic situations, and determinate 
situations.  In doing so, Burke interprets situations for Dewey from the standpoint of 
indeterminate situations, which is a misinterpretation.   
 After examining Burke’s interpretation of situations, Browning proceeds to 
present an alternative account.  If Browning’s interpretation of Dewey’s account of 
situations is accurate, then, I argue, it has several implications on Russell’s interpretation 
of Dewey’s account of situations.  In accepting Browning’s interpretation, it reveals that 
Russell’s argument is based on false assumptions about Dewey’s actual views.   
 Russell, then, has failed to understand various aspects of Dewey’s theory of 
inquiry.  His interpretation of Dewey’s account of situations is revealed to be 
contradictory when examined in light of Browning’s interpretation of Dewey’s account 
of situations.  Since Russell’s argument rests on a set of sentences (premises and 
conclusions) that are in conflict with the actual world, it follows that his interpretation of 
Dewey’s argument is inaccurate.   
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 Another error that Russell commits in examining Dewey’s work is that he 
attempts to define situations in general – that is, he tries to formulate a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions that serve to define situations.  In doing so, Russell neglects to 
consider that situations are contextual, and can only be understood within a context.  
They can be discussed, cognized, and reflected upon, but never experienced in the same 
way in which they originally occurred.  In defining situations, Russell formulates 
universal constraints on situations, but situations, by their very nature, are contextual 
and, thus, cannot be universalized.   In his discussion and interpretation of Dewey, then, 
Russell has failed to understand the role of the situation in Dewey’s account of logic. 
 When viewed from a historical perspective, Dewey’s theory of inquiry is 
revolutionary.  Dewey’s intention to formulate a logic built around the situations that 
occur in everyday life brings logic away from its traditional picture as a detached 
discipline dealing with abstract analysis of the syntax of linguistic statements to a logic 
built around the analysis of how people function in their everyday life.  A logic that 
deals with the affairs of everyday life serves the practical function of impacting people 
and how they relate to their environment.  In other words, it has existential import. 
 Given this import, it is easy to see then why Dewey’s logic is so noteworthy and 
important to current society.  In and of itself, it is a theory about the way in which 
organisms adapt to and maintain a balance with their everyday environment.  Any theory 
that purports to explain how people remain connected to and in balance with their 
environment is a theory that has the function of impacting our everyday lives.  Thus, 
from an applicatory perspective, Dewey’s theory of inquiry can be seen as important 
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insofar as it discusses how we arrive at judgments, how the physical sciences relate to 
our social institutions and relations, and how our natural and social sciences should be 
viewed and conducted. 
 One goal for this thesis was to point out a few commentators’ interpretations of 
Dewey, and show why I disagree with them.  Even more important, however, was the 
overarching goal of formulating an exegesis of Dewey’s logical theory and subsequently 
uniting this exegesis into a single account.  In pursuing these goals, my aim has been to 
show why Dewey’s work is not only important but also thorough in content.  
Unfortunately, Dewey’s theory of inquiry has been disregarded by current logicians 
because of its lack of formal representation.  However, it is, nevertheless, a significant 
body of knowledge and work that can have serious theoretical as well as applicatory 
significance.  Dewey intended for his work to be regarded as among the very best logical 
doctrines developed, and I hope that I have shown throughout this thesis that it has the 
properties and scope to fulfill this function.   
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